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1. Introduction
The economic interests of the typical U.S. public rm are geographically dispersed. A rm's corporate
headquarters may be in one state while its plants and operations are located in other states, often far away
from the headquarters. Similarly, customers and suppliers, R&D facilities, and other rm activities need
not be concentrated around the headquarters.1 When the economic interests of a rm are geographically
dispersed, value-relevant information about the rm is also likely to be spatially distributed.
In this paper, we examine whether the spatial distribution of information about publicly traded
U.S. rms aects the ownership patterns and portfolio performance of institutional investors. Our
key conjecture is that the geographical variation in rms' local economic activities generates location-
based information asymmetries among investors, which in turn inuence the portfolio decisions and
performance of those investors.
There are several reasons why the spatial distribution of rms' activities could result in information
asymmetries among capital market participants. First, geographical dispersion could aect how e-
ciently the rm aggregates and reports value-relevant information. Geographically dispersed rms may
not be able to collect and report information as eciently as geographically concentrated rms (e.g.,
Aarland, Davis, Henderson, and Ono (2007), Giroud (2013)). As such, some local information may be
lost in the aggregation process, giving investors in proximity of economically relevant non-headquarters
(ER, henceforth) locations an informational advantage.
Second, local channels could provide investors at ER locations with more timely access to value-
relevant information about the rm. For instance, several recent studies suggest that local news media
act as external monitors (e.g., Miller (2006), Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales (2008), and Dyck, Morse, and
Zingales (2010)), which could provide an edge to local investors. Local social networks could be another
important channel through which information about rms may reach local investors. For instance,
1For example, although Boeing Co. is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, most of its operations are in the state of
Washington. Similarly, Whole Foods Market is headquartered in Austin, Texas, but has a large number of stores and
signicant exposure in other states - e.g., Massachusetts, Florida, Colorado. Xerox Corp., which many perceive as a
Rochester, New York company due to its large local presence, is headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut.
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Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) document that social networks
explain investors' portfolio decisions and performance. Thus, it seems reasonable that local social ties
of investors around the rm's activities could provide access to local agents - e.g., employees, customers,
suppliers, etc. - who are likely to possess value-relevant information.
While proximity to local sources of information about rms' activities may result in local informa-
tional advantages, it is also possible that investors would have distorted perceptions as a result of such
proximity. For example, while Engelberg and Parsons (2011) show that the coverage by local media
outlets has a causal impact on local investor trading, Gurun and Butler (2012) show that conicts of in-
terests may hamper the role of local media as external monitors. Therefore, local investors could perceive
an informational advantage that does not really exist. Whether due to location-dependent asymmetries
in the availability of valuable information or merely in the perception of such availability, proximity to
rm's economic activities would aect investors' portfolio decisions and give rise to geography-based
market segmentation even when nancial markets are integrated (e.g., van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009)).
Testing our conjecture that the spatial distribution of rm-level information aects investor portfolio
decisions requires us to map the geographical distribution of a rm's economic interests and measure the
relative importance of each location for the rm. To do this, we need information about the geographical
dispersion of plants, operations, R&D facilities, retail outlets, and other value-relevant activities and
events. Unfortunately, this information is not reported in a systematic manner. We overcome this
hurdle by performing a textual analysis of a rm's annual nancial reports (10-K) to identify U.S. states
that are economically relevant to that rm. Similar to Garca and Norli (2012), we measure a rm's
10K-based geographical dispersion with the number of unique states cited in its 10-K. We refer to the
non-headquarters locations mentioned in the rm's annual report as its ER states. Then, we construct
a novel measure of the relative importance of each state for each rm. We refer to this rm-state metric
as a rm's 10K-based measure of local exposure, which is dened as the number of mentions of a state
in the rm's 10-K divided by the total number of mentions of all U.S. states in the same report.
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Our empirical analysis relies on the premise that mentions of U.S. states in a rm's annual report
identify locations where the rm has meaningful economic interests that are material to the rm's
performance. The parsing algorithm, however, cannot identify the specic nature of the rm-state link
and the resulting citation share measures may be noisy. Hence, before proceeding with our main analysis,
we examine whether the identication of ER states and their citation shares are associated with the
availability of local value-relevant information.2 The rationale underlying these tests is that rms sharing
ER locations would face common local shocks and/or have systemic relations, which would generate a
common local component in their stock returns as well as their operating performance and capital
investments. Furthermore, important to our investigation, the 10K-based measure of local exposure
should explain the systematic variation in the local component of rm performance.
Our tests provide robust support for the premise that the 10K-based measures of rms' local exposure
reect the potential availability of local information. First, using state portfolio regressions, we nd that
there is a strong link between rms that are headquartered in a given state and rms that have high
local exposure but are not headquartered in that state. We nd these local commonalities whether we
examine the rms' stock returns, returns on assets, or capital expenditures. This analysis shows that
recognizing the multi-dimensional nature of rm location allows for a more comprehensive examination
of geography-based co-movement relative to previous studies that examine the stock return co-movement
of rms sharing headquarters locations (e.g., Pirinsky and Wang (2006)).
Second, using stock-level regressions, we nd that asset pricing models that include local market
factors identied using the 10K-based measure of local exposure explain more of the time-series variation
in returns than models that include only national market factors. This analysis is similar to those
performed by Grin (2002) and Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011) for evaluating global versus domestic
factor models in an international context. We recast the tests in terms of national versus local (i.e.,
state) market factors, and nd that the explanatory power of pricing models increases by at least 22
percent when the national factor is replaced with local factors identied using our method.
2We thank the Editor and referees for suggesting this line of analysis.
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Third, we nd that the 10K-based measures of rms' geographical dispersion and local exposure
explain the systematic variation in the local component of stock returns. Specically, stock returns are
more sensitive to the local return factor when the corresponding state is mentioned in a rm's 10-K and
this relation is stronger as the rm-state citation share increases. In sum, we conclude that a rm-state
citation share serves as a useful proxy for a rm's local exposure.
In the next set of tests, we use the 10K-based measures of local exposure to answer two broad
research questions related to our main conjecture. First, we examine whether geographical distribution
of institutional stock ownership and portfolio decisions depends on the spatial variation in the rm's local
exposure. Second, we investigate whether the availability of local information aects how institutional
portfolio decisions are related to subsequent stock returns and portfolio performance. Our empirical
tests yield several novel ndings.
Our rst key nding is that the excess local institutional ownership depends largely on the rm's local
exposure, independent of distance from HQ location.3 Indeed, complementing earlier local bias studies,
we show that the average excess local ownership in the HQ state is in fact negative (=  1.62 percent)
when the 10-K does not mention the state, and increases monotonically with citation share to 14.58
percent when the HQ state's citation share is over 50 percent. Similarly, the excess local institutional
ownership is negative (=  0.22 percent) in non-HQ states not mentioned in the 10-K, and increases
monotonically with citation share to 6.17 percent when the ER state's citation share is over 50 percent.
Second, similar to existing evidence for HQ state investors, institutional ownership levels and changes
in the three non-HQ states with highest citation share (i.e., ER1 3) predict subsequent stock returns.
However, the link between stock characteristics and institutional ownership explains large part of the
local ownership-based return predictability. Indeed, when we account for return dierences associated
with stock characteristics using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method, we nd
that only the ownership changes of local institutions in ER1 3 states are able to predict future returns.
3While our study focuses on the multi-dimensional nature of rm location, other recent studies by Pool, Stoman, and
Yonker (2012) and Shu, Sulaeman, and Yeung (2012) examine the multi-dimensional nature of investor location and nd
that an investor's portfolio decisions are related to where she was born and/or went to college, in addition to where she
currently resides.
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This evidence is consistent with institutions in those states having a local informational advantage.
Third, the eect of a rm's local exposure on local investors depends heavily on rm characteristics
that are typically associated with greater diculty in valuing the rm and, thus, greater information
asymmetry among investors. Specically, we nd that the direct link between the rm-state local
exposure and excess local institutional ownership is stronger when the rm is young or small, or has
less liquid stocks, higher return volatility, or higher return skewness. Moreover, consistent with a more
valuable local informational advantage, the direct link between institutional ownership changes at ER1 3
locations and future returns is stronger among these harder-to-value stocks.
In the last part of the paper, we conduct a series of portfolio-level tests to complement our rm-
level analysis. Portfolio-level analysis allows for a direct comparison between our ndings and those
in previous studies that quantify the holdings and performance of institutional investors conditional on
their distance from rm HQ (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (2001)). More importantly, shifting the focus to
investor portfolios allows us to test whether the performance of local institutions depends on the degree of
local exposure of their portfolio holdings. Consistent with our rm-level results, we nd that institutional
investors allocate disproportionately high portfolio weights to local ER1 3 stocks and experience superior
risk-adjusted returns on their local ER1 3 holdings and trades (i.e., holdings changes).
Importantly, the performance of institutional investors' local ER portfolios depends directly on the
potential availability of local information, both at the level of the individual holding and of the local
portfolio as a whole. Specically, we nd that institutional performance in local ER1 3 stocks is higher
when the rm's local exposure is higher, i.e., the 10-K citation share of the investor's state is higher.
Further, local ER1 3 institutional portfolios have better performance when the portfolio as a whole has
higher and more homogeneous local exposure, i.e., when the portfolio rms have high mean and low
standard deviation of the investor's state's citation share. This evidence suggests that an investor may
be able to exploit local information about some local rms in her portfolio to trade protably on other
local stocks, potentially due to commonalities among rms that share ER locations. Last, consistent
with the notion that valuable access to local information drives institutional investors' local ER bias,
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the relation between local exposure and the performance of local ER1 3 subportfolio is stronger when
the overall portfolio tilts more heavily toward local ER1 3 stocks.
These ndings make important contributions to the local bias literature and the emerging literature in
nance that recognizes the importance of geography. Our study is the rst to show that the institutional
local bias phenomenon is not exclusive to rms' HQ locations. Rather it is typical of locations where
value-relevant information about a rm may be available. Indeed, complementing previous studies of
local excess ownership around HQ locations (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Baik, Kang, and Kim
(2010)), we show that even the local HQ bias largely depends on a rm's local exposure in its HQ
state. Moreover, consistent with our main conjecture, we demonstrate that the local institutional bias
in economically relevant locations away from the HQ state is due to a local informational advantage.
Further supporting this inference, we show that the availability of local information has the largest
impact on institutional ownership and is most valuable amongst harder-to-value stocks.
Our second contribution to the local bias literature results from the analysis of local investor portfolios
conditional on the local exposure of the investor holdings. We demonstrate that an investor's ability to
earn superior returns on her local investment depends directly on the degree of local exposure of the
individual stock as well as of her portfolio as a whole. In conjunction with our validation tests, these
results suggest that an investor may be able to exploit information about some local rms in her portfolio
to trade protably on other local stocks.
Overall, we conclude that the spatial distribution of information about rm value generates mean-
ingful location-based information asymmetries, which institutional investors exploit in their portfolio
decisions. More broadly, our ndings highlight the importance of recognizing the multi-dimensional na-
ture of rm location and the consequent variation in the local availability of information. In this regard,
the evidence in the rst part of this study provides strong indication that our 10K-based measure of
local exposure should prove useful in future research where local information generation plays a central
role, including geography-based investment, asset pricing, and corporate nance studies. For example,
recognizing that the economic interests of the typical multinational corporation span the globe, it would
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seem natural to extend our asset-pricing analysis to an international context.
2. Data Sources and Summary Statistics
In this section, we discuss our main data sources and present the sample summary statistics for the 10K-
based measures of geographical dispersion and local exposure. Table 1 provides a concise description of
all the variables and data sources used in our empirical analysis.
2.1. 10K-Based Firm Location Data
Our rst main data source is the set of annual nancial reports led with the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) between 1998 and 2008, and stored on the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. We retrieve 144,071 unique rm-year lings for this period
from EDGAR.4 For the same period, we retrieve 76,403 rm-year observations with identiable headquar-
ters locations in the US from the historical header les of Compustat-CRSP merged database (CCM).
After merging the two les, our sample includes 64,405 unique rm-year observations with non-missing
geographical data for the 1998-2008 period.
Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require companies with more than $10
million in assets and whose securities are held by more than 500 individuals to le an annual report (Form
10-K) to provide a comprehensive overview of the company's business and nancial condition. Although
this standardized form contains four parts and 15 schedules, for the purpose of our analysis, similar to
Garca and Norli (2012), we focus on Items 1, 2, 6, and 7. Item 1 summarizes the general development of
the business, its subsidiaries, and any predecessor(s) during the prior ve years, as well as the structure
and conditions of the rm's industry. Item 2 lists the location and general characteristics of the principal
physical properties of the company. Item 6 includes selected nancial data to highlight trends in the rm's
nancial condition and operating performance. Finally, Item 7 includes the management's discussion
4While we refer to annual reports as 10-K forms throughout the paper, we collect and employ data from three types of
forms: 10-K, 10-KSB, or 20-F. The latter two forms correspond to small businesses and foreign issuers, respectively.
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and analysis (MD&A) of the company's performance.5
Like Garca and Norli (2012), we use a computer-based parsing algorithm to identify U.S. states
mentioned in the relevant sections of the 10-K lings. We refer to the number of cited states as the
10K-based measure of geographical dispersion. In addition to this measure, we develop a new measure
that reects the frequency with which the relevant sections mention each U.S. state or Washington D.C.
In particular, we use the citation counts to compute the citation share of each location in each rm's
annual nancial report.6 The rm-state citation share is dened as the number of times a U.S. state is
cited divided by the total number of citations across all U.S. locations. We refer to this rm-state metric
as the 10K-based measure of local exposure.
Panel A of Table 2 presents sample summary statistics of the 10K-based measures of rm geographical
dispersion and local exposure. The average rm in our sample mentions eight U.S. states (median is ve).
While headquarters states tend to have relatively high citation shares (mean = 0:414, median = 0:368),
the citation share of the most economically-relevant state away from headquarters (henceforth, ER1)
tends to be large as well (mean = 0:216, median = 0:176). Moreover, the three most economically-
relevant states away from headquarters (henceforth, ER1 3) make up about half of the total number of
citations (mean = 0:491, median = 0:500) in the typical rm-year. These summary statistics suggest
that a typical rm is likely to have large presence and visibility in non-headquarters states. Even though
we exclude international locations, ER1 3 states are often located far, on average more than 1,000 miles
away, from the rm's headquarters.
Although the dispersion of rms' economic interests across the U.S. states can vary over time, if our
10K-based measure is meaningful, it should not change signicantly from year-to-year. Consistent with
this expectation, we nd that rm-state citation shares are quite persistent.7 In about two-thirds of
5Appendix A provides more details on the information contained in the relevant sections of the annual nancial reports,
while Appendix B provides sample excerpts from some 10-K forms led during the 1998 to 2008 sample period.
6Our parsing algorithm would miss instances where the 10-K ling mentions the city but not the state. We would also
be unable to capture cases in which the 10-K lings use state abbreviations. Inspection of a randomly selected set of lings
indicates that both cases are rare. Further, there is no reason to believe that certain types of rms or rms located in
certain states are more likely to abbreviate states or mention only city names in their reports. Thus, the citation counts
may be noisy but the relative frequency measure across rms would not exhibit a systematic bias due to these exclusions.
7For brevity we do not tabulate these results.
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observations, the most economically relevant state for a rm (i.e., ER1) in a given year is one of the top
three economically-relevant states for the rm (i.e., ER1 3) in each of the previous three years. Further,
in more than 90 percent of observations, a rm's ER1 state in a given year is an ER1 3 state at least
once in the previous three years.
To further assess the economic validity of our 10K-based measures, Panels B and C of Table 2 report
summary statistics for various subsamples based on rm size and industry aliation. Specically, in
Panel B, we report mean Num States Cited, HQ State Citation Share, and Citation Concentration by
size terciles. Consistent with economic intuition, rms' geographical dispersion increases monotonically
with rm size. By the same token, rms' HQ state citation share and, more generally, their citation
share concentration across the U.S. states decrease monotonically with size.
Panel C reports similar statistics for the Fama-French 12-industry classication. We nd that Fi-
nancial and Business Equipment rms tend to be most concentrated, whereas Telecommunication and
Retail rms are most dispersed. Overall, these summary statistics provide prima facie evidence that the
10K-based measures of geographical dispersion and local exposure are economically meaningful.8
2.2. Other Data Sources
Our second main data source is the set of quarterly common stock holdings of 13(f) institutions compiled
by Thomson Reuters. We identify the institutional investor location (i.e., zip code) using the Nelson's
Directory of Investment Managers and by searching the SEC documents and web sites of institutional
managers. We match these institution location data with 10K-based measures from the annual report
corresponding to the reporting period ending in the preceding calendar year. For example, for a rm
whose annual reporting period ends in December 2000, the information in the corresponding 10-K is
used to develop the rm's 10K-based measures that are employed in our analysis for 2001. We use this
approach to avoid potential look-ahead bias in our returns-based tests.9
8Section 3 presents more formal tests of whether the 10K-based metrics provide a meaningful measure of the availability
of local information about rm value.
9 While this approach may be too conservative for rms that signicantly change their exposure across states from one
year to the next, the rm-state citation share and citation share rankings are quite persistent, as previously discussed.
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In addition to the two main data sources, we use several other standard data sets. We obtain
price, volume, return, and industry membership data from the Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP). The rm headquarters location data are from Compact Disclosure (where available) and CRSP-
Compustat merged (CCM) historical header le. We obtain monthly time series of the market (RMRF),
size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors from Kenneth French's web site.10 We obtain
the performance benchmarks for computing characteristic-adjusted stock returns from Russell Wermers'
web site.11
To match the 10K-based measures with the other databases, we use the Central Index Key (CIK)
that all entities registered with the SEC are uniquely assigned. Matching the CIK in the rms' 10-K
lings with the CCM historical header le allows matching of the annual 10K-based location data with
all other databases.
3. Citation Share and Economic Connections
Our main empirical tests are based on the key premise that the 10K-based measures of geographical
dispersion and local exposure are meaningful proxies for the availability of local information about rm
value. Therefore, we begin our analysis by assessing the validity of this premise. Our main objective is to
determine whether our 10K-based measures do indeed identify economically meaningful rm-state links.
We follow two related but distinct approaches. First, we examine the correlations in stock returns and
operating fundamentals of state-level portfolios of rms with overlapping locations (i.e., HQ and ER1 3
portfolios). Second, we examine whether the 10K-based measures of local exposure are correlated with
market-based measures of rms' exposure to local factors.
Therefore, we opt to err on the side of caution with respect to the look-ahead bias and use potentially stale location data,
which in principle should work against nding signicant results.
10The web site is http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
11The web site is http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
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3.1. Correlations among Returns of Portfolios Sharing State Locations
To begin, we examine whether there is a local component in stock returns when rms' local exposure
is identied based on our 10K-based measures. This investigation is similar to existing studies of local
return co-movement (e.g., Pirinsky and Wang (2006)), but our tests do not focus on the co-movement
among stocks in the same headquarters location. Rather, we examine whether there is co-movement
among rms with overlapping HQ and ER1 3 locations. More precisely, we test whether the stock
returns of rms headquartered in a given state (i.e., HQ portfolio) co-move with the returns of rms that
are not headquartered in the state but for which the location is an ER1 3 state (i.e., ER1 3 portfolio).
We form two state-level portfolios: (a) rms headquartered in state s and (b) rms not headquartered
in state s, but for which state s is an ER1 3 state. To assess the co-movement in the returns of these
portfolios, we estimate the following state-level time-series regression model:
(1) ReturnER1 3;s;t = ai;t + bHQ ReturnHQ;s;t
+ bMKT MKTt + bSMB  SMBt + bHML HMLt + bUMD  UMDt
+ bStateMktCap  State HQ=ER Firms0 Total Mkt Caps;t
+ bStateNumFirm  State Num HQ=ER Firmss;t + ei;t;
where ReturnER1 3;s;t is the monthly return of the portfolio of rms not headquartered in state s, but for
which state s is an ER1 3 state; ReturnHQ;s;t is the monthly return of the portfolio of rms headquartered
in state s; MKTt, SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the monthly market, size, value, and momentum
return factors, respectively; State HQ=ER Firms0 Total Mkt Caps;t is the aggregate equity market
capitalization of rms for which state s is either the HQ or ER1 3 location; State Num HQ=ER Firmss;t
is the number of rms for which state s is either the HQ or ER1 3 location.12 All return indexes are
based on monthly stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate. We estimate separate state-level time-
12We include the last two terms in equation (1) to capture the potential supply and demand eects of local capital (Hong,
Kubik, and Stein (2008)). Our results are not aected if we exclude these terms from the model.
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series models, and report cross-state mean regression estimates and test statistics in columns (1)-(3) of
Panel A of Table 3.
The rst column in Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimates based on value-weighted local portfolio
returns. The estimated coecient on the local HQ portfolio (bHQ) is positive and signicant. This
evidence indicates that there is a local component in the portfolio returns of rms with high local
exposure but no HQ in the state, i.e., rms for which the location is an ER1 3 state.
For comparison, column (2) in Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of a placebo test where we
examine the correlation between the local HQ portfolio and the portfolio of rms for which the state is
not (very) relevant. The dependent variable in column (2) is ReturnNoER1 3;s;t, which is the monthly
return of the portfolio of rms not headquartered in state s and for which the location is not an ER1 3
state.13 In contrast to the positive co-movement documented in column (1), the returns of rms with
no ER1 3 exposure in state s are not correlated with the returns of rms whose HQ are in state s.
In column (3), we replace the value-weighted local portfolios with citation share-weighted local port-
folios. Specically, stocks in the local HQ and ER1 3 portfolios are weighted by the state citation shares
in the rms' 10-K lings, so that rms with greater local exposure receive more weight. The correlation
between the local HQ and ER1 3 portfolios is again positive and signicant, as in column (1). Moreover,
the estimated bHQ is signicantly higher than in column (1), where the portfolio returns are weighted
by market capitalization. This nding suggests that the rm-state citation share reects incremental
information about a rm's exposure to a particular state.
For robustness, we re-estimate the relation between state-level portfolio returns using Fama-MacBeth
(1973) method. We report the time-series mean coecient estimates of these monthly cross-sectional
(i.e., cross-state) regressions in columns (4)-(6) of Panel A of Table 3. In this case, we exclude the
national return factors because they are constant in each cross-section. The evidence from this alternative
estimation approach is in line with the earlier results, which suggests that our ndings are robust.
Overall, the evidence in Panel A of Table 3 is consistent with the existence of a state-level local
13The No ER1 3 portfolio for state s is the complement of the HQ and ER1 3 portfolios with respect to the market
portfolio.
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component in the returns of rms that have high exposure to a state. The source of this local commonality
in stock returns could be i) a local commonality in fundamentals, such that the returns of rms sharing
economically relevant locations co-move more strongly due to local correlations in cash-ows; and/or ii)
a local commonality in investor bases/trading.
3.2. Correlations among Fundamentals of Portfolios Sharing State Locations
In Panel B of Table 3, we test whether there is local commonality in rm fundamentals. Rather than
study stock return correlations as in Panel A, we examine the correlation in operating performance and
capital expenditures between portfolios of (a) rms with HQ in state s and (b) rms for which state
s is an ER1 3 state. Specically, we estimate the following regression model using state-level portfolio
indexes of local rms:
(2) IndexER1 3;s;t = ai;t + bHQ  IndexHQ;s;t
+ bMKT  IndexMKT;t
+ bStateMktCap  State HQ=ER Firms0 Mkt Caps;t
+ bStateNumFirm  State Num HQ=ER Firmss;t + ei;t;
where IndexER1 3;s;t is the operating performance or capital expenditures index of rms for which state s
is an ER1 3 state; IndexHQ;s;t is the corresponding index of rms headquartered in state s; IndexMKT;t is
the corresponding index of the entire population of Compustat rms; State HQ=ER Firms0 Total Mkt
Caps;t and State Num HQ=ER Firmss;t are as dened above. Similar to models (3) and (6) of Panel
A, the local portfolio indexes, IndexER1 3;s;t and IndexHQ;s;t, are weighted by rm-state citation share.
The index measures are based on quarterly sales-to-assets in columns (1) and (4), EBITDA-to-assets
in columns (2) and (5), or CAPEX-to-assets in columns (3) and (6). In all cases, the numerator (i.e., sales,
EBITDA, or CAPEX) is measured as of the reporting quarter-end and the denominator (i.e., assets)
is measured as of the beginning of the quarter. Similar to Panel A, the rst three columns (labeled
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State-Level Time-Series) report cross-state mean coecients and associated t-statistics of state-level
time-series regressions, while the last three columns (labeled Quarter-Level Cross-Sections) report the
time-series mean coecients of Fama-MacBeth (1973) quarterly cross-sectional regressions.
The results in Panel B of Table 3 are consistent with the stock return correlations documented in
Panel A. Across all measures and estimation approaches, we nd that there is a positive and signicant
correlation between the fundamentals of ER1 3 and HQ portfolios.14 This evidence suggests that local
commonalities in rm fundamentals at least partially explain the local commonality in stock returns.
Overall, the results in Table 3 support the notion that mentions of state locations in rms' 10-K lings
are economically meaningful, as they identify the rms' exposure to state-level factors. Consequently,
the 10K-based measure of local exposure would be associated with the availability of local information
about rm value.
3.3. Asset Pricing Models Including Local Return Factors
Next, we conduct two related rm-level analyses to assess the potential link between the 10K-based
measure of local exposure and local return factors. First, we examine the performance of asset pricing
models that include local return factors identied on the basis of our 10K-based measure of local exposure.
Second, we examine whether the rm-state 10K-based measures explain the variation in market-based
(i.e., stock return-based) measures of rms' exposure to local factors.
Our local factor pricing analysis is similar to the analysis that Grin (2002) and Hou, Karolyi, and
Kho (2011) conduct in international settings. Instead of using global and national factors as in those
studies, we employ national and local market factors. In particular, we estimate rm-level pricing models
based on 36-month rolling-window regressions that include various formulations of the market index. We
begin with the standard CAPM model, where the proxy for the market index is the value-weighted mean
stock return of all rms headquartered in the U.S. This model specication, which we refer to as model
14For brevity, we do not report the results for value-weighted local or non-local portfolios. However, it is worth noting
that the value-weighted indexes yield patterns consistent with the stock return results in Panel A. While we nd positive
but smaller correlations using value-weighted local portfolios, there is no evidence of direct relations when we use non-local
portfolios.
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(1) in Panel A of Table 4, assumes that the US market is fully integrated.
Alternatively, we assume that the US market is fully segmented at the state-level, and that the
importance of each rm in the local market is captured by the 10K-based measures of local exposure.
We operationalize this alternative approach by replacing the US market index with two distinct local
market indexes that are constructed using only rms that share the relevant state location with the rm
being priced: (i) HQ index, the local stock return index of rms that share the HQ state with the rm,
and (ii) HQ/ER1 3 index, the local stock return index of rms whose HQ or ER1 3 locations are in the
rm's HQ or ER1 3 states. In Panel A of Table 4, we refer to these as models (2) and (3), respectively.
Last, we assume that the US market is partially integrated by adding a second factor that reects
the returns of rms that do not share relevant state locations with the rm being priced. This model
includes the HQ/ER1 3 index and the Non HQ/ER1 3 index. The non-local index is the complement
of the local index, i.e., it includes all rms that do not have HQ or ER1 3 locations in the HQ or ER1 3
states of the rm being priced. We refer to this specication as model (4) in Panel A of Table 4.
Panel A of Table 4 reports various measures of goodness of t for each of these models: the mean and
median of absolute pricing errors (jaj), value-weighted absolute pricing errors (VW jaj), and explanatory
power (Adj. R2) across all models. Following Grin (2002), we use value-weighted indexes, in Panel
A1, or alternatively equal-weighted indexes, in Panel A2. Further, in the last six columns of Panel A,
we augment all the models by adding the national Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) factors.
We nd that pricing errors are generally lower for models that assume segmented or partially inte-
grated US markets than models that assume a fully integrated market. However, there is no clear ranking
between the rst two types of models. In addition, the explanatory power of the pricing models generally
increases as we replace the national index with either the local HQ/ER1 3 index alone or a combination
of the local and non-local indexes. In particular, Panel A1 shows that the adjusted R2 increases by at
least 22 percent (i.e., from 9.41% to 11.49%) when we replace the value-weighted national index with a
combination of local and non-local indexes. By contrast, we observe no improvement in the performance
of the pricing model when we use the local HQ index alone. In sum, pricing models that include local
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factors identied using the 10K-based measure of local exposure perform better and explain more of the
time-series variation in rm-level returns than models that include the national market factor or the HQ
local factor.
3.4. Relation between Market- and 10K-based Local Exposure Measures
The contrast between models (1) and (3) or (4) and (6) in Panel A of Table 3 suggests that the degree
of local exposure reected in the rm-state citation share, as opposed to the mere fact that a state is
mentioned, is important in capturing the local component in stock returns. In Panel B of Table 4, we
directly examine the link between the 10K-based measure of local exposure and the local component
in stock returns. To capture the local component in returns, we generate two rm-state market-based
measures of local exposure. Our approach is similar to the method used in the local return factor tests
discussed in the previous section.
First, for each rm-yearend we estimate the following four-factor regression model using a 36-month
rolling window:
(3) RetRFi;t = ai;t + bMKT;i;t  VWMktRFt
+ bSMB;i;t  SMBt + bHML;i;t HMLt + bUMD;i;t  UMDt + ei;t;
where RetRFi;t is rm i's stock return in excess of the risk free rate in month t and the independent
variables are the Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) monthly return factors. This specication
is identical to model (1) in Panel A of Table 4.
Then, separately for each rm-yearend-state, we estimate an augmented model where we add the
state local factor. We construct the local factor using the excess returns of local rms, dened as
rms for which the state is an ER1 3 or HQ location. Consistent with the earlier analysis, we adopt
two alternative weighting schemes for the local portfolio: value-weighting and citation-share-weighting.
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Specically, we estimate the following two models:
(4a) RetRFi;t = ai;t + bLOC;i;t;s  VWLocalRF i;t;s + bMKT;i;t  VWMKTRFt
+ bSMB;i;t  SMBt + bHML;i;t HMLt + bUMD;i;t  UMDt + ei;t;
and
(4b) RetRFi;t = ai;t + bLOC;i;t;s  SWLocalRF i;t;s + bMKT;i;t  VWMKTRFt
+ bSMB;i;t  SMBt + bHML;i;t HMLt + bUMD;i;t  UMDt + ei;t;
where VWLocalRF i;t;s is the value-weighted average excess return of the portfolio of local rms in
state s excluding rm i, and SWLocalRF i;t;s is the citation share-weighted average of the same local
portfolio. Equation (4a) is similar to model (3) in Panel A, except for the inclusion of the national index
and the state-specic nature of the model.15
Finally, using the rm-year-state estimates from models (4a) and (4b), we develop two market-
based measures of local exposure: Local Beta, the rm-year-state estimate of bLOC;i;t;s; and Delta R
2,
the incremental R-squared from the addition of the local factor in models (4a) or (4b) relative to the
baseline model (3). With these two measures, we aim to capture a rm's exposure to the local factor.
The rst measure reects the stock's return co-movement with stocks that have local exposure in the
state according to the 10K-based measure. The second measure represents the incremental fraction
of the stock's return variation that is explained by the state-level return factor. The main distinction
between the two measures is that the rst is directional since positive co-movement results in positive
bLOC and negative co-movement results in negative bLOC , while the second is not as both positive and
negative co-movement will result in higher Delta R2.
In our tests, we regress the rms' market-based measures of local exposure on the 10K-based geog-
15We include the national index to ensure that our measures capture the incremental eect of the addition of the local
index to the traditional four-factor model.
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raphy measures. In addition to a HQ State indicator that captures the rm headquarters state location,
we include the following two 10K-based measures of local exposure: (i) a Cited State indicator that is
equal to one for states mentioned in the rm's 10-K, and (ii) the continuous rm-state Citation Share
variable. The rst measure reects whether the state is mentioned at all in the rm's 10-K, while the
second captures the relative intensity with which the state is mentioned in the report. By construction,
both variables are equal to zero when the state is not cited in the relevant sections of the rm's 10-K.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of these tests. Specically, the table reports eight sets of mean
regression estimates and corresponding test statistics that dier by whether we: (i) estimate (a) cross-
rm regressions at the year-state level or (b) cross-state regressions at the year-rm level; (ii) construct
the local factor for the market-based measure using (a) value-weighting or (b) citation share-weighting;
and (iii) employ as the market-based measure (a) Local Beta or (b) Delta R2.
The estimates from the various specications provide strong and robust support for our fundamental
premise that the 10K-based measure of local exposure explains the variation in market-based measures of
local exposure, both within state-years/across rms and within rm-years/across states. Namely, when
a rm's nancial report mentions a state location, and does so more frequently, the rm's stock returns
co-move more strongly with local returns. Across all specications, we nd that the citation share's eect
is incremental and large relative to the discrete eect of a state mention. In fact, the citation share's
eect is an order of magnitude larger than the discrete eect when we use citation share-weighting to
calculate the local market factor.
Overall, the evidence in this section consistently supports the notion that the 10K-based rm-state
measure of local economic exposure reects the local component of rms' stock market and accounting
performance. This nding in turn supports the premise of our main analysis that the 10K-based measure
reects the potential availability of local value-relevant information about a rm.
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4. Firm Geography and Local Ownership
In this section, we use the 10K-based local economic exposure measure as a proxy for the availability
of local information about rm value and examine how the spatial distribution of rm-level information
aects institutional ownership patterns. Specically, we examine the relation between excess state
aggregate institutional ownership and the 10K-based rm-state measure of local exposure.
4.1. Univariate Results
Table 5 reports the mean rm-state excess local ownership for various location-based subsamples. We
begin by replicating the results documented in previous studies that institutional investors around rms'
HQ own disproportionately high fractions of the shares of those rms. We then present two novel results.
First, we show that excess local HQ ownership depends largely on the rm-HQ state exposure as captured
by the HQ state's citation share. For example, the average excess local ownership of investors in HQ
states with citation shares between 20 and 50 percent is 8.35 percent, which is more than twice the
average excess local ownership of investors in HQ states with citation shares below 5 percent but higher
than zero. Moreover, the average excess local ownership is 14.58 percent when the HQ state's citation
share is over 50 percent. In contrast, the average HQ local bias is negative (= 1.62 percent) when 10-K
lings do not mention the rm HQ state.
Second, and more importantly, we nd that the propensity to own disproportionately large fractions
of shares of local rms is not a phenomenon exclusive to HQ states' institutional investors. The excess
institutional ownership is also positive in ER states and increases monotonically with the rm's local
exposure. For example, the average excess institutional ownership in ER states with citation shares
between 20 and 50 (above 50) percent is 5.28 (6.17) percent, which is more than ve (six) times the
average excess local ownership of investors in ER states with citation shares below 5 percent but higher
than zero.
It is also noteworthy that the link between the rm-state citation share and local ownership bias
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does not depend on the geographical proximity to the rm's HQ state. As the distance from HQ state
increases, we do not observe a negative eect on ER states' excess ownership. In sum, these univariate
results indicate that excess local institutional ownership is typical of states where the rm has local
exposure independent of the rm's HQ location.
In Panel B of Table 5, we also document a monotonic relation between a rm's excess institutional
ownership in ER states and the ordinal ranking of the states' citation shares. The average excess local
ownership of investors in the non-HQ state with the highest citation share (i.e., ER1 state) is 5.18
percent, which is more than four times the average excess local ownership in the state with the third
highest citation share (i.e., ER3 state) and almost 10 times higher than in ER4 or ER5 states. In light
of this nding and the evidence in Table 2, which shows that HQ and ER1 3 states jointly account for
90% of the state mentions in a typical 10-K, we focus on these states in subsequent analyses in Sections
5 and 6.
4.2. Multiple Regression Analysis of Local Ownership
We perform a series of multiple regression tests to account for the heterogeneity in rm and state charac-
teristics that may be related to the degree of excess local ownership and rm local exposure. In particular,
we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions of the local excess institutional ownership
on the 10K-based measures, while controlling for rm characteristics and state-level heterogeneity using
state xed eects.
Table 6 reports the local ownership regression estimates. The evidence shows that, holding all else
constant, rm-state excess institutional ownership is strongly related to the 10K-based measure of local
exposure. In particular, the rm-state citation share is a signicant determinant of the local excess
institutional ownership. Moreover, its eect is notably large relative to the location-type xed eects
(i.e., HQ State and Cited State) - see model (2). Compared to the model that includes only US state
xed eects and state-type indicators - see model (1), we nd that the rm-state citation share absorbs
much of the HQ State and Cited State xed eects. Namely, comparing the state-type coecients across
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models (1) and (2) shows that the variation in rm-state citation shares accounts for almost half of the
average HQ State's eect and two-thirds of the average Cited State's eect. Hence, the degree of local
exposure is an important determinant of excess local ownership, both in absolute terms and relative to
the location-type xed eects.
In models (4) to (7), we add the market-based rm-state measures of local exposure to assess their
explanatory power relative to the 10K-based measures. The estimates for models (4) and (5) show that
the market-based measures explain excess local ownership in a way that is similar to the 10K-based
measures. However, the economic and statistical signicance of the market-based measures is either
swamped (Delta R2 regression) or reduced (Local Beta regression) when we include both types of local
exposure measures in models (6) and (7).
Model (8) shows that the strong relation between citation share and excess local ownership is unaf-
fected when we control for a large set of stock characteristics including all control variables used in Baik,
Kang, and Kim (2010). The coecient estimate for the HQ state indicator implies that the average
excess local ownership in a non-cited HQ state is 2.390 percent higher, all else equal. Adding this eect
to the Cited State and Citation Share eects, we nd that the incremental excess local ownership in a
cited HQ state with an average citation share (of 41.4%, from Table 2) is more than three times as large:
7.741 percent (=2.390% + 0.337% + 41.4% * 12.111%).
The large coecient estimates on Cited State and Citation Share also highlight that ignoring the
multi-dimensional nature of rm location results in a severe underestimation of the excess ownership
of local institutions. In particular, all else equal, the incremental excess local ownership in an average
ER1 state is 2.953 percent (=0.337% + 21.6% * 12.111%), while the cumulative incremental excess local
ownership in the average ER1 3 states is 6.958 percent (=3 * 0.337% + 49.1% * 12.111%).16
In sum, the evidence in Table 6 is consistent with our conjecture that the local institutional ownership
patterns depend on the potential availability of local information about a rm, as reected in our 10K-
based rm-state measure of local exposure.
16As reported in Table 2, the mean citation share of ER1 state is 21.6%, while the mean combined citation share of ER1 3
states is 49.1%.
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4.3. Firm Characteristics, Citation Share, and Local Ownership
We next examine whether the relation between a rm's local exposure and its excess local ownership is
more pronounced when access to local information is likely to be more benecial. To test this conjecture,
we add to our base specication interaction terms that capture the eect of the diculty in valuing a
rm on the relation between the rm's local exposure and its excess local ownership. Specically, we
examine interactions of the 10K-based measures of local exposure with the following rm characteristics:
size, Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, age, R&D intensity, idiosyncratic return volatility, idiosyncratic
return skewness, and stock price. Because they are harder to value, we hypothesize that the direct
relation between local exposure and excess local ownership would be stronger for smaller, more illiquid,
younger, higher R&D, higher volatility, higher skewness, and lower price stocks.17
Table 7 reports the regression estimates for these augmented models, where we add the interactions
to the full model (8) reported in Table 6. To highlight the typical negative sensitivity of non-local
investors to these characteristics, we also report the parameter estimates for the relevant characteristics.
Consistent with the logic of our tests, whereby non-local investors suer a disadvantage when rms are
harder to value, we nd that they avoid smaller or younger rms, as well as stocks that are less liquid,
have higher skewness, or higher volatility.
In direct contrast, the positive eect of the 10K-based measures of local exposure on a rm's excess
local ownership is signicantly stronger when the rm is harder to value. In particular, the regression
estimates show that excess local ownership of institutional investors whose domicile state is mentioned
in the rm's 10-K is higher for young, illiquid, highly volatile, highly skewed, and low priced rms. In
addition to this eect, the sensitivity of local ownership to the degree of local exposure (i.e., rm-state
citation share) is incrementally higher for those hard-to-value stocks.
Overall, the evidence in Table 7 is strongly consistent with our conjecture that a rm's local exposure
has a stronger eect on its local ownership levels when the rm is harder to value because potential access
17Several earlier studies use similar proxies for the diculty of valuing a rm (see among others, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang
(2005); Zhang (2006); and Kumar (2009)).
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to local information is more benecial. More broadly, this evidence supports our conjecture that spatial
variation in the availability of information about a rm is a key determinant of its local institutional
ownership.
5. Local Ownership and Stock Returns
In this section, we examine whether the spatial distribution of rms' economic interests aects the
relation between local ownership and stock returns. Our tests are similar to those in Baik, Kang, and
Kim (2010), which show that local HQ institutional ownership levels and changes predict future raw
returns.
5.1. Baseline Stock Return Regressions
To begin, we follow closely the approach in Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010, henceforth BKK). In particular,
we regress subsequent quarter raw stock returns on the quarterly institutional ownership lagged levels
and current changes, after separating institutions in two groups. The rst group includes local HQ
institutions, while the second includes all non-HQ institutions. We control for all stock characteristics
included in BKK and estimate the models using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. Model (1) in
Table 8 includes ownership levels and changes of local HQ investors alone, as in BKK. Consistent with
their results, we nd that subsequent quarter returns vary directly and signicantly with the local HQ
ownership levels and changes. Then, in model (2), we again follow BKK and add the non-HQ institutional
ownership levels and changes to the model specication.18 Again consistent with their ndings, the non-
HQ ownership variables are not signicant and their inclusion does not aect the local HQ parameter
estimates.
In the remainder of Table 8, we examine in greater depth the role of non-HQ institutions by rst
separating them into two mutually exclusive sets: (i) Local ER1 3 institutions, and (ii) all remaining
non-HQ institutions, which we label Non-Local. Then, we replace the non-HQ ownership variables
18Models (1) and (2) in Table 8 follow closely models (4) and (8) in Table 4 of Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010).
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of model (2) with corresponding ones for each set of non-HQ institutions in models (3) to (5).19 The
estimates from model (3) indicate that the eect of non-HQ institutional ownership variables depends on
the investors' likely access to local information about the rm. Specically, the eects of the Non-Local
ownership variables are not statistically signicant, similar to the aggregate eects of non-HQ variables
in model (2). In contrast, we nd that both the ownership levels and changes of Local ER1 3 institutions
are positively and signicantly related to subsequent raw stock returns. Hence, consistent with our main
conjecture, the investment decisions of non-HQ institutions with potential access to value-relevant local
information predict future stock returns.
In addition to the control variables in BKK, we also include a control for rms' geographical dispersion
in the spirit of Garca and Norli (2012). Specically, we add an indicator variable that is equal to one
when the rm's 10-K contains no mention of any non-HQ state. In line with the ndings in Garca
and Norli, this variable has a positive coecient estimate. Thus, rms with more dispersed locations
have lower returns, on average. More important for our purposes, however, our results on the eects
of non-HQ ownership are robust to controlling for rms' geographical concentration as well as all other
stock characteristics included in the model.
Our results so far are based on raw quarterly returns and do not account for risk. While our
regression models control for numerous rm characteristics related to risk, there could be non-linearities
in the relation between certain characteristics (i.e., size, B/M ratio, and past returns) and future stock
returns that a linear regression specication may not accommodate. As a result, our inferences may be
biased if location-dependent institutional portfolio decisions depend on stock characteristics. Therefore,
in the last two columns, we control for dierences across rms using characteristic-adjusted returns
computed using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method.
As shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 8, this adjustment has a large eect on some key estimates.
First, both local HQ ownership variables lose signicance. The estimated coecient on HQ ownership
19For the reasons explained at the end of Section 4, we shift our focus from the full set of cited states, as in Tables 5 to 7,
to the top three non-HQ cited states, in Table 8 onwards. In previous versions of this paper, we used the top ve non-HQ
cited states instead, which yielded similar, but unsurprisingly weaker results.
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levels drops between 50% and 65%, while the estimated coecient on HQ ownership changes drops
between 20% and 35%. Also, as a result, both coecients are no longer statistically signicant at
conventional condence levels. Similarly, the estimated coecient on ER1 3 ownership levels drops by
an even larger amount (between 80% and 95%) and is no longer statistically signicant at conventional
levels. Therefore, the local ownership levels regardless of the location-type and the HQ ownership changes
do not predict future returns, once we account for rm characteristics more appropriately.
Notably, the predictive power of ER1 3 ownership changes with respect to future returns remains
virtually unaected when we use characteristic-adjusted returns. In fact, the corresponding coecient
estimate becomes somewhat larger (between 17% and 20%) and remains highly statistically signicant,
at the 1% condence level. This eect is also economically large: a one standard deviation increase
in the quarterly ER1 3 ownership change is associated with a 0.23% increase in characteristic-adjusted
monthly returns. By comparison, the coecient estimate for the change in ER1 3 ownership is more
than three times as large as the corresponding estimate for the change in HQ ownership.
Overall, quarterly changes in ER1 3 ownership are the only location-dependent component of a
rm's institutional ownership that displays a sizeable, signicant, and robust relation with subsequent
returns. This evidence suggests that local ER1 3 trades alone are likely to reect a signicant informa-
tional advantage - rather than the underlying link between rm characteristics and location-dependent
institutional portfolio decisions.
5.2. Firm Characteristics and Local Ownership-Return Relation
In this section, we complement the analysis of local ownership in Table 7 by examining whether the local
ER1 3 investors' informational advantage is more pronounced for harder-to-value stocks. Specically, we
test whether the direct relation between changes in local ER1 3 ownership and subsequent characteristic-
adjusted returns is stronger for harder-to-value stocks. Table 9 reports the results of this analysis.
To conduct our tests, we augment the full model (5) in Table 8 by adding interaction terms between
ER1 3 ownership changes and the same set of rm characteristics used in Table 7. To facilitate the
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economic interpretation of these interaction terms, we use indicator variables for the following rm-
types: small (below-median market capitalization), illiquid (above-median Amihud illiquidity measure),
young (stocks whose IPO occurred in the prior ve years), R&D intensive (above-median R&D over asset
ratio), volatile (above-median idiosyncratic stock return volatility), skewed (above-median idiosyncratic
stock return skewness), and low priced (below-median stock price). For completeness, we also include
interactions between these same indicator variables and the local HQ ownership changes.
Several notable patterns emerge in Table 9. First, the regression coecient estimates for the stan-
dalone ER1 3 ownership changes indicate that the predictive power of this variable is mostly signicant
even for stocks with lower information asymmetry (e.g., large or liquid stocks).
Second, and more importantly, the regressions estimates for the ER1 3 interaction terms suggest that
the predictive power of ER1 3 ownership changes is indeed signicantly larger for stocks that are harder
to value. For example, the estimated coecient on the interaction between the small rm indicator and
ER1 3 ownership changes (= 3.417) is similar in magnitude to the baseline coecient estimate of the
ER1 3 ownership change (= 3.507). This evidence implies that the predictive power of ER1 3 ownership
changes for small stocks is approximately twice that for large stocks. With the exception of low-priced
stocks, we observe similar patterns for all other harder-to-value characteristic indicators. In contrast,
there is no consistent pattern in the coecient estimates of the interaction terms associated with changes
in local HQ ownership. With one exception (i.e., illiquid stocks), there is no evidence to support the
idea that HQ investors' informational advantage may be signicant among harder-to-value stocks.
Overall, the results in Table 9 imply that local ER1 3 investors enjoy a larger informational advantage
among stocks that are harder to value. Combined with the results in Table 7, this evidence is consistent
with the notion that the higher excess ownership of local ER1 3 institutions in harder-to-value stocks is
likely due to a more valuable local informational advantage.
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6. Institutional Portfolio-Level Analysis
In the last part of the paper, we shift the focus of our analysis from rm-level to investor portfolio-level.
That is, instead of examining the relations between a rm's local exposure and its location-dependent
institutional ownership or between a rm's location-dependent ownership and stock returns, we examine
how an investor's location-dependent holdings and performance vary with the holdings' local exposure.
Similar to Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), this analysis allows us to quantify excess local holdings
(i.e., local bias) at the investor-level and provides an opportunity to compare the performance of an
investor's local and non-local holdings. The investor-level analysis is particularly useful because it allows
us to examine directly the joint impact of location-dependent portfolio decisions and portfolio holdings'
local economic exposure on local investor performance.
6.1. Portfolio-level Local Bias
Table 10 reports the mean local bias by stock location-type (i.e., HQ and ER1 3) for various investor
samples. Examining equal-weighted means, we nd that the average institution in our sample allocates
a disproportionately high portfolio weight to local stocks, independent of stock location-type. Although
the magnitudes vary across subsamples, there is evidence of local bias in all subsamples of institutions
dened using investor self-reported type or portfolio size.
The evidence is considerably dierent when we focus on dollar-weighted means to quantify the average
portfolio local bias. At the aggregate level as well as across investor types and portfolio sizes, we nd
evidence of local bias only for ER1 3 stocks, with magnitudes comparable to the equal-weighted results.
In contrast, there is no evidence of local HQ bias in the aggregate portfolio. This nding is due to the
fact that large portfolios, which account for 20% of the institutions but almost 90% of the holdings,
display no HQ bias.20
Overall, although local stocks receive disproportionately large weights in the portfolio of the average
20Our nding that large institutions have weaker local bias is consistent with previous evidence obtained using dierent
samples, e.g., mutual funds during an earlier period in Coval and Moskowitz (2001).
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investor, the local bias phenomenon is robust and pervasive only among local ER1 3 stocks. This
evidence suggests that focusing on HQ locations while ignoring the geographically dispersed nature of
rms' economic interests and value-relevant local information results in a substantial underestimation of
the institutional local bias.
6.2. Performance of Local Portfolios
Next, we examine the performance of location-dependent investor subportfolios to determine whether
the average investor's local overweighting is due to a local information advantage or familiarity bias. In
particular, we divide each investor's quarterly portfolio into three mutually exclusive subportfolios: local
HQ, local ER1 3, and non-local (i.e., the rest). We then analyze the performance of each subportfolio
using its raw and risk-adjusted return in the subsequent quarter. Table 11 summarizes the results for
each subportfolio's quarter-end holdings (Panel A) or net quarterly changes in holdings (Panel B).
The evidence in Panel A of Table 11 is consistent with information-based local bias. In line with
our earlier evidence, this is especially true for local ER1 3 subportfolios. The average investor's local
ER1 3 subportfolio outperforms her non-local holdings by about 17-25 bps per month (with t-statistics
above 3.2), depending on the choice of risk/characteristic adjustments. This eect is largest among
institutions self-identied as investment companies and advisors, which make up more than half of our
institutional investor sample. In contrast, the dierence in performance between local HQ and non-
local subportfolios is smaller in magnitude (about 4-7 bps per month on average) and not statistically
signicant at conventional condence levels (with t-statistics between 1.08 and 1.59).
In Panel B of Table 11, we focus on the trading performance of the subportfolios to assess whether
the informational advantage underlying the superior performance of local investments is due to arrival
of new information. Given the quarterly frequency of their portfolio disclosures, we use net changes
in quarterly holdings to measure (net) trading by our sample institutions during a quarter. We then
measure the average performance of net changes in local/non-local holdings.21
21More precisely, the trading performance is calculated as the dierence between the performance of the investor portfolio
as reported at the end of the previous quarter and that of the investor portfolio as reported at the beginning of the previous
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Adding to the local information-driven interpretation, we nd that the average institution performs
signicantly better on trades in local ER1 3 but not those in local HQ stocks. Almost half of the superior
performance of local ER1 3 investments relative to non-local ones reported in Panel A can be attributed
to the quarterly changes in holdings. This dierence is between 8 and 11 bps per month depending on
the risk/characteristic adjustments. Again, in line with the evidence in Panel A, this eect is particularly
strong for investment companies and advisers.
In sum, the evidence in Table 11 is consistent with the notion that the availability of value-relevant
local information, as captured by the 10K-based local exposure measure, provides local investors an
informational advantage that justies disproportionately high portfolio allocations to local ER1 3 stocks.
These results are particularly strong among investment companies and advisors.
In our last battery of tests, we analyze whether the patterns in portfolio-level local bias and perfor-
mance depend on the degree of local exposure of the portfolio holdings. Specically, we rst examine
whether the excess weights and superior performance of local ER1 3 investments are more pronounced
for local stocks with high local exposure (Table 12) and when the investor's local portfolio as a whole has
a higher and more homogeneous local exposure (Tables 13). Then, in Table 14, we test directly whether
the investor's local portfolio performance is a joint function of her portfolio's local information content
and weights in local stocks.
6.3. Stocks-level Local Exposure
For the analysis reported in Table 12, rst, we rank stocks available to the state institutional investor
by the degree of their local exposure, i.e., using the annual rm-state citation shares. Then, we classify
stocks in each state-year's top tercile of citation share as high local exposure stocks. We repeat this
procedure separately for local HQ, local ER1 3, and non-local stocks. Finally, we segment each state
investor's location-based (local HQ, local ER1 3, or non-local) holdings by their local exposure (Top
quarter. Because the returns from the part of the portfolio that does not change over the quarter cancel out, the measured
trading performance is solely attributed to the part of the portfolio that changes during the previous quarter.
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Tercile vs. Others) as just described.22
Panel A of Table 12 reports the mean local bias for each location type. Examining equal-weighted
means, we nd that the average institutional investor displays a statistically signicant local bias regard-
less of the location type for high local exposure stocks (i.e., stocks in the Top Tercile of rm-state citation
share), while there is no evidence of local bias for other local stocks. For the average investor, the mean
dierences in local bias across local exposure subsamples are statistically signicant at conventional lev-
els. However, other notable patterns emerge in Table 12, which reinforce our earlier inference. First, the
average institution's local bias in high local exposure rms is approximately three times larger among
ER1 3 stocks than HQ ones. Moreover, for the aggregate institutional portfolio (i.e., dollar-weighted
means), there is evidence of local bias only among high local exposure ER1 3 stocks.
In the remainder of Table 12, we benchmark the performance of local HQ and ER1 3 subportfolios
that include high local exposure stocks against the performance of either the non-local portfolio with the
same local exposure rank or the corresponding local subportfolio with low exposure stocks. We focus on
the subsequent quarter performance of quarter-end holdings in Panel B and on the subsequent quarter
performance of net quarterly changes in holdings in Panel C.
The results across these two panels show that the local exposure of individual holdings, as captured
by the rm-state citation share, is an important determinant of the local holdings performance. This is
especially true when we control for variation in stock characteristics (see last two columns of Panels B
and C). Focusing on the characteristic-adjusted returns, the average institutional investor's local ER1 3
holdings with high local exposure outperform her non-local holdings by approximately 40bps in the next
quarter and her holdings in local ER1 3 stocks with low citation share by more than 30bps. Moreover,
as implied by the evidence in Panel C, the superior performance of the average investor in local ER1 3
stocks with high local exposure is largely due to her quarterly trading, i.e., changes in portfolio holdings
during the quarter.
22This classication results in six subportfolios for each state investor. These subportfolios are the unit of observation in
our analysis: Local HQ (stocks)/Top Tercile (of rm-state citation share) and Local HQ/Others; Local ER1 3/Top Tercile
and Local ER1 3/Others; and Non-Local/Top Tercile and Non-Local/Others.
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While we nd somewhat similar patterns among the average investor's local HQ stocks, the eect of
rm-state local exposure on local HQ portfolio performance is weaker both statistically and economically.
Further, in contrast with the ER1 3 results, we nd no evidence of superior performance in local HQ
portfolio quarterly trades, regardless of their degree of local exposure.
Overall, the evidence in Table 12 is consistent with our conjecture that local investors' informational
advantage increases with the availability of value-relevant local information about the stock, as captured
by the rm-state citation share. Moreover, consistent with our earlier results, we nd that this link is
particularly strong for local ER1 3 stocks, as opposed to local HQ rms.
6.4. Portfolio-level Local Information Content
We now turn to the relation between investors' local portfolio performance and portfolio-level local
exposure. With this analysis we aim to examine two potential eects. The rst is the direct eect of the
HQ or ER1 3 subportfolio's local exposure on the subportfolio's own performance. The second is the
indirect (spillover) eect of the HQ or ER1 3 subportfolio's local exposure on the performance of the
other local (ER1 3 or HQ) subportfolio's performance.
Our examination of portfolio-level local exposure is motivated by the evidence of return correlations
among rms that share economically relevant locations and of corresponding local commonalities in
rm fundamentals - in Section 3. Jointly, these local commonalities suggest the existence of systematic
local factors that aect local rms and/or systemic relations among local rms (e.g., customer-supplier
linkages). Based on this evidence, we conjecture that an informed local investor would be able to exploit
information about some local stocks in her portfolio to trade protably on other local stocks.
To examine whether institutions exploit locally gathered information as we conjecture, we rst con-
struct a portfolio-level measure of local information content (LIC). This new measure is based on the
rst and second moments of the rm-state citation shares of stocks in the investor portfolio. Specically,
we sort investor local portfolios based on how the mean and standard deviation of the citation shares
of their local HQ or ER1 3 subportfolio stocks compare with their respective state-year medians. Then,
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we classify the investor subportfolio as containing a homogeneously high LIC, if the subportfolio stocks
have above-median mean and below-median standard deviation of the investor's state citation share.
In Table 13, we examine whether the excess weight and performance of each local (Local HQ or Local
ER1 3) subportfolio vary with the investor portfolio LIC. Local subportfolios with homogeneously high
LIC should be associated with superior access to local value-relevant information across the investor's
local holdings. Therefore, we expect subportfolios with homogeneously high LIC to have superior (excess)
performance.
The evidence in Table 13 reveals several interesting patterns. First, there is evidence of a subportfolio-
level direct eect for local ER1 3 holdings. Consistent with our conjecture, local ER1 3 subportfolios
with homogeneously high LIC experience superior average performance of 46.9 bps per month (Panel
B). In contrast, we nd no such eect for local HQ subportfolios (Panel A).
Second, there is also some evidence of an indirect eect, although this eect is unidirectional. The
performance of the average investor's local ER1 3 subportfolio is higher when her local HQ subportfolio
has a homogeneously high LIC (Panel A). This evidence is consistent with the results in Section 3,
which indicate that rms with overlapping geographical exposure are aected by common local factors.
In combination, both types of homogeneously high LIC subportfolios (i.e., HQ and ER1 3) positively
aect the aggregate local performance, but the eect is coming mostly, if not exclusively, from the
performance of local ER1 3 subportfolios.
In sum, the portfolio LIC-based results indicate that an investor's local informational advantage
depends on the local information content of the investor's portfolio. In the next subsection, we examine
whether local investors exploit the potential information advantage that results from the portfolio-level
local information content. Specically, we test whether an investor's local performance depends more
strongly on her portfolio's local information content when her investments are more heavily tilted toward
local stocks.
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6.5. Joint Eects of Portfolio Local Bias and LIC on Local Performance
In our analysis of the joint eect of an investor's portfolio local bias and local information content on
her local performance, we focus on three related aspects. First, we test whether the magnitude of the
investor's local bias explains the performance of her local holdings. If a local informational advantage
induces her to overweight local stocks, then the investor's local performance should increase with her
local bias. Second, we test whether the investor's local performance depends on her portfolio's LIC
(local information content). If the investor's local performance reects her access to local value-relevant
information, then her local performance should increase with her portfolio LIC. Third, we test whether
the two eects are complementary. We conjecture that higher local bias reects a higher local information
advantage when the portfolio LIC is higher. Therefore, we expect that the interaction of the portfolio
local bias and LIC would be associated with higher local performance.
Table 14 summarizes the results. The regression estimates in the table support our conjecture that
the availability of local portfolio-level value-relevant information yields a local informational advantage
that institutional investors exploit through their local ER1 3 portfolio decisions. In particular, we nd
that the performance of local ER1 3 subportfolios depends directly on the level of portfolio bias in
local ER1 3 stocks. Moreover, this direct link is stronger when the local ER1 3 subportfolio has a
homogeneously high LIC. In particular, the point estimates suggest that the link between local ER1 3
bias on local ER1 3 performance is almost twice as strong when the portfolio has a high LIC (i.e., (2.360
+ 2.583) vs. 2.583). In line with other evidence throughout our study, we nd no such pattern for local
HQ subportfolios.
In sum, the evidence in Table 14 shows that the direct relation between portfolio LIC and performance
is stronger when an investor allocates greater weight to her local investments. This supports our main
conjecture that access to valuable local information drives institutional investors' local ER bias. In this
regard, our tests consistently indicate that the 10K-based rm-state measure of local exposure reects
the availability of valuable local information that institutional investors can access and exploit.
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7. Summary and Conclusion
In this study, we use a multi-dimensional measure of rm location to examine the local bias and informa-
tional advantage of U.S. institutional investors. We identify U.S. states that are economically relevant
for a rm through a textual analysis of its annual 10-K lings. The premise of our investigation is that
mentions of U.S. states in a rm's annual nancial report identify locations where the rm has mean-
ingful economic interests and its reported performance is determined. Using the citation counts in each
report, we develop a rm-state 10K-based measure of local exposure, i.e., citation share of the state in
the rm's 10-K ling. Our measure relaxes the assumption in the existing literature that links each rm
with only its HQ location. Instead, it allows a rm to have multiple locations, potentially including the
HQ location, and varying degrees of local exposures across states. This broader approach overcomes the
recurring criticism of geography-based studies that a rm's headquarters location may not capture the
true geographical location of the rm.
Using the multi-dimensional measure of local exposure, we document a series of novel ndings. In the
rst part of the paper, we nd support for the premise of our empirical strategy. In particular, the 10K-
based measure of local exposure is useful to identify the local component of rms' stock and operating
performance. Moreover, we show that local factors identied using the 10K-based measure explain a
substantial part of variation in stock returns. Most important for our purposes, we demonstrate that the
10K-based local exposure measure explains the systematic rm-level variation in the local component of
stock returns.
In the second part of the paper, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the spatial
distribution of information about rms' economic interests generates location-dependent information
asymmetries, which in turn aect institutional investors' portfolio decisions and performance. Speci-
cally, we nd that excess local institutional ownership increases with the state's relevance for the rm,
independent of headquarters location. Consistent with a local information advantage outside of the
headquarters location, local non-HQ institutional trades predict future stock returns. Further, investor
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proximity to local non-HQ information sources has a larger impact on institutional excess ownership
and trading performance when rms are harder-to-value. Importantly, the strength of the link between
local institutions' portfolio decisions and subsequent returns depends directly on the degree of potential
availability of local information.
Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of recognizing the multi-dimensional nature of rms'
geographical location. Beyond our study, the measure of local economic exposure that we develop should
prove useful in future research that studies local ownership and local information generation, as well as
other strands of geography-based investment, asset pricing, and corporate nance research. Relatedly,
it would seem natural for international studies to consider the eects of non-HQ countries, particularly
for multinational companies whose economic interests are dispersed globally.
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Appendix A Description of Form 10-K's Items 1, 2, 6, and 7
The U.S. federal securities laws require companies issuing publicly traded securities to disclose informa-
tion on an ongoing basis. Notably, Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires
companies with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500 owners to
le an annual report (Form 10-K) providing a comprehensive overview of the company's business and
nancial condition. A 10-K must be led within 90 days after the end of the scal year covered by
the report. This form contains information such as company history, organizational structure, executive
compensation, equity, subsidiaries, and audited nancial statements, among other information. Regula-
tion S-K outlines the reporting requirements for various SEC lings used by public companies, including
Form 10-K. Although this standardized form contains four parts and 15 schedules, for the purpose of
our analysis, we focus on Items 1, 2, 6, and 7.
Section 229.101 of Regulation S-K requires that Item 1 in Form 10-K summarizes the general devel-
opment of the business of the ling company, its subsidiaries and any predecessor(s) during the prior
ve years. The business description is expected to include all material information about the company's
(i) principal products or services and their markets; (i) distribution methods; (iii) competitive position
in the industry and methods of competition; (iv) sources and availability of raw materials, and principal
suppliers; (v) dependence on major customers; (vi) patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises, concessions,
royalty agreements, or labor contracts; (vii) need for any government approval of principal products or
services; (viii) eect of existing or probable regulations; (ix) research and development activities; and
(x) number of employees. This item also includes any potentially material litigation risk.
Item 2 of Form 10-K, pursuant to Section 229.102, lists the location and general character of the
principal plants, mines, and other materially important physical properties of the company and its
subsidiaries. In principle, this item should include any information that will inform investors as to
the suitability, adequacy, productive capacity and extent of utilization of the facilities by the company,
although a detailed description of the physical characteristics of individual properties is not required.
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Section 229.301 requires for Item 6 of Form 10-K to supply in a convenient and readable format
selected nancial data that highlight certain signicant trends in the company's nancial condition
and operating performance. Subject to appropriate variation due to the nature of the business, the
following items are expected to be included: (i) net sales or operating revenues; (ii) income (loss) from
continuing operations; (iii) income (loss) from continuing operations per common share; (iv)total assets;
(v) long-term obligations and redeemable preferred stock (including long-term debt, capital leases, and
redeemable preferred stock); and (vi) cash dividends declared per common share.
Finally, pursuant to section 229.303, Item 7 of the annual report includes the management's discussion
and analysis (MD&A) of the company's nancial condition and results of operations. The purpose of
MD&A is to provide readers with information that may help their understanding of the nancial data
included in the annual report. This section is intended to meet three broad objectives: (i) provide a
narrative explanation of a company's nancial statements that enables investors to see the company
through the eyes of management; (ii) enhance the overall nancial disclosure and provide the context
within which nancial information should be analyzed; and (iii) provide information about the quality
and potential variability a company's earnings and cash ow, so that investors may assess the extent to
which past performance is indicative of future performance.
Specically, the MD&A is expected to identify current trends, deciencies, and commitments, and
highlight any expected changes pertaining to the company's liquidity and capital resources. Moreover,
it should identify unusual events or signicant economic changes that materially aected the reported
operating results, and describe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or are expected to have
a favorable or unfavorable impact on the company's operations. Finally, the discussion should provide
explicit information regarding o-balance sheet arrangements that have or are likely to have an eect
on the company's nancial performance.
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Appendix B Excerpts from Items 1, 2, 6, and 7
Following are some representative examples of excerpts from Form 10-K led during the 1996 to 2008
period and available on the SEC's EDGAR system. Specically, we report those passages appearing in
Items 1, 2, 6, or 7 of the annual report that make any explicit reference to one of the 50 U.S. states or
the District of Columbia. For ease of presentation, the referenced locations are underlined.
Example 1: RELM WIRELESS CORPORATION
CIK 0000002186, Form 10-K led on 2008-03-05
Item 1 - Business:: : : Our principal executive oces are located at 7100 Technology Drive, West
Melbourne, Florida 32904: : : In June 2007, one of our dealers was awarded a contract to be the exclusive
supplier of BK Radio-brand P-25 digital portable radios and accessories to the West Virginia Division
of Forestry: : :In May 2007, the California Department of Forestry (CDF) extended its contract with our
authorized RELM BK Radio dealer: : : In May 2007, we received a certicate of award for a contract to be
a supplier of two-way radio communications equipment to the state government of North Carolina: : :As
of December 31, 2007, we had 101 full-time employees, most of whom are located at our West Melbourne,
Florida facility: : :
Item 2 - Properties:: : :We lease approximately 54,000 square feet of industrial space at 7100 Tech-
nology Drive in West Melbourne, Florida: : :We also lease 8,100 square feet of oce space in Lawrence,
Kansas, to accommodate a segment of our engineering team: : :.
Item 7 - MD&A:: : :We lease approximately 54,000 square feet of industrial space at 7100 Technology
Drive in West Melbourne, Florida: : :We also lease 8,100 square feet of oce space in Lawrence, Kansas,
to accommodate a segment of our engineering team: : :.
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Example 2: LEHMAN T H & CO INC
CIK 0000721647, Form 10-KSB led on 2001-06-29
Item 1 - Business:: : : Eective October 27, 1989, the Company acquired all of the outstanding stock
of Self Powered Lighting, Inc. a New York corporation with oces in Elmsford, New York (\SPL") from
an entity aliated with two of the Company's directors: : : Presently, the company has one client, which
operates a specialty clinic in the Los Angeles, California area: : : eective February 1, 1993, the Company
purchased Healthcare Professional Billing Corp. (HPB), in Broomeld, Colorado: : :
Item 2 - Properties:: : : The Company presently has an administrative sharing arrangement which,
among other things, provides use of other oce facilities in Houston, Texas. MedFin Management
Corporation leases oce space in Burbank, California under an operating lease: : :
Example 3: ELECTRONIC TELE COMMUNICATIONS INC
CIK 0000773547, Form 10-K405 led on 1997-03-27
Item 1 - Business:: : : Electronic Tele-Communications, Inc. is a Wisconsin corporation, incorporated
in 1980: : : ETC has executive oces, manufacturing, engineering, technical services, marketing, and a
regional sales oce in Waukesha, Wisconsin. In addition, engineering, technical services, and corporate
sales sta are located in Atlanta, Georgia, and technical services, repair services, and a regional sales
oce are located in Pleasanton, California: : : A sta of degreed meteorologists, using state-of-the-art
information services and equipment, update weather forecasts at least four times daily from ETC's
weather center in Atlanta, Georgia: : : The Company's corporate sales sta and a regional sales oce are
located in Atlanta, Georgia. The Company's marketing sta are headquartered in Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In addition regional sales oces are located in Waukesha, Wisconsin and Pleasanton, California, and
ve sales representatives are at various other locations in the United States: : :
Item 2 - Properties:: : : The Company's executive oces, manufacturing and engineering facilities,
technical services, marketing, and a regional sales oce are located at 1915 MacArthur Road, Wauke-
sha, Wisconsin 53188: : : The Company leases 87,300 square feet in seven buildings located in Atlanta,
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Georgia: : : The Company leases 12,277 square feet at 6689 Owens Drive, Suite B, Pleasanton, California
94588: : : The Company believes that its equipment and facilities at its California location are modern,
well maintained, and adequate for its anticipated needs: : :
Example 4: BOEING CO
CIK 0000012927, Form 10-K led on 1997-03-10
Item 2 - Properties: The locations and oor areas of the Company's principal operating properties
at January 1, 1997, are indicated in the following table: : : United States: Seattle, Washington; Wichita,
Kansas; Greater Los Angeles area; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Portland, Oregon; Palmdale, California;
Huntsville, Alabama; Oakridge, Tennessee; Sunnyvale, California; Spokane, Washington; Corinth & Irv-
ing, Texas; Duluth, Georgia; Vienna, Virginia; Chicago, Illinois; Glasgow, Montana; Tulsa, Oklahoma: : :
With the exception of the Glasgow Industrial Airport located in Glasgow, Montana, which is Company-
owned, runways and taxiways used by the Company are located on airport properties owned by others
and are used by the Company jointly with others: : :
Example 5: XEROX CORP
CIK 0000108772, Form 10-K led on 1999-03-22
Item 2 - Properties:: : : The domestic facilities are located in California, New York and Oklahoma: : :
The Company also has four principal research facilities; two are owned facilities in New York and Canada,
and two are leased facilities in California and France: : : The Company's Corporate Headquarters facility,




This table provides a brief description of all variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable Denition and Source
Panel A: Firm Geography and 10K-Based Measures
HQ State The U.S. state or the District of Columbia in which the rm headquarters are
located. Sources: Compustat and Compact Disclosure.
Cited State A U.S. state or the District of Columbia that is mentioned at least once in
sections 1, 2, 6, or 7 of the rm's annual nancial statement. Source: Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K lings.
Distance From HQ The distance in miles between the U.S. state's population-weighted centroid
and the rm HQ State population-weighted centroid. Source: Computed.
Dist. From HQ (EW/SW) The equal- or citation share-weighted average distance in miles between
the rm's cited states' population-weighted centroids and its HQ state's
population-weighted centroid. Source: Computed.
Citation Share Ratio of the number of times a U.S. state is mentioned in the relevant sections
of the 10-K to the total number of mentions across all U.S. states. Source:
SEC 10-K lings.P
Citation Share Sum of Citation Shares across relevant states. Source: Computed.
Citation Share Rank The ordinal ranking of the state's Citation Share in the rm-year.
Num States Cited The number of Cited States. Source: SEC 10-K lings.
Citation Concentration The sum of squared Citation Shares divided by the square of the sum of
Citation Shares. Source: SEC 10-K lings.
Panel B: Firm-State Ownership Variables
State Ownershipf;s;t State-level ownership of rm f , calculated as aggregate ownership share of
institutional investors in state s as a fraction of total institutional ownership
share in rm f . Source: Thomson Reuters.
State Excess Ownershipf;s;t State ownershipf;s;t minus the aggregate ownership share of institutions in
state s across all rms in quarter t. Source: Thomson Reuters.
Local HQ Excess Ownershipf;t State excess ownership of rm f 's HQ state.
Local ERk Excess Ownershipf;t State excess ownership of rm f 's non-HQ state with k
th Citation Share Rank.
Local HQ Ownf;t HQ state-level institutional ownership of rm f , calculated as number of rm
f 's shares held by institutional investors in state s at end of quarter t as a
fraction of shares outstanding. Source: Thomson Reuters.
 Local HQ Ownf;(t 1)!t Quarterly change in Local HQ Ownf , calculated as the dierence between
Local HQ Ownf;t and Local HQ Ownf;t 1.
Local ERk Ownf;t ERk state-level institutional ownership of rm f , calculated as number of rm
f 's shares held by institutional investors in state s at end of quarter t as a
fraction of shares outstanding. Source: Thomson Reuters.
 Local ERk Ownf;(t 1)!t Quarterly change in Local ERk Ownf , calculated as the dierence between




Variable Denition and Source
Panel C: Stock-level Variables
Raw Stock Return Quarterly stock return. Source: Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP).
Characteristic-Adjusted Return Quarterly stock return adjusted for size, market-to-book, and momentum as
in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Source: Russell Wermers'
web site.
Market Cap Stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Source: CRSP.
Past Six-Month Return Stock return over the past six months. Source: CRSP.
Market-to-Book (M/B) Market equity plus book assets minus book equity divided by book assets.
Source: Compustat and CRSP.
Stock Price Stock price at the beginning of the quarter. Source: CRSP.
Amihud Illiquidity Average Amihud (2002) daily volume price impact during the quarter. Source:
CRSP.
Eective Spread Average daily eective spread during the quarter. Source: CRSP (TAQ).
Dividend Yield Quarterly dividend divided by quarter end close stock price. Source: Compu-
stat, CRSP.
R&D Quarterly R&D expenses scaled by book assets at the beginning of the quarter.
Source: Compustat.
S&P500 Indicator variable for stocks in the S&P500 index. Source: CRSP.
Young Indicator variable for stocks whose IPO occurred in the prior ve years. Source:
CRSP.
Idio. Volatility Volatility of residuals of annual market-model regressions of monthly stock
returns. Source: CRSP.
Idio. Skewness Skewness of residuals of annual market-model regressions. Source: CRSP.
Lottery Stocks Indicator variable for rms that are in the top third of volatility, and the top
third of skewness, and the bottom third of price. Source: CRSP.
Panel D: State-Level Variables
State HQ Return (VW, SW) Mean monthly stock return on the (value- or citation share-weighted) portfolio
of rms that are headquartered in the state. Source: CRSP.
State ERk Return (VW, SW) Mean monthly stock return on the (value- or citation share-weighted) portfolio
of rms for which the state is a Cited State with Citation Share Rank of k.
Source: CRSP.
State no-ERk Return (VW) Mean monthly stock return on the (value-weighted) portfolio of rms for which
the state is not a Cited State with Citation Share Rank of k nor the HQ state.
Source: CRSP.
State HQ Index (SW) Mean quarterly index of the citation share-weighted portfolio of rms that are
headquartered in the state. Source: Compustat.
State ERk Index (SW) Mean quarterly index of the citation share-weighted portfolio of rms for which




Variable Denition and Source
Panel D: State-Level Variables (Continued)
State Num HQ/ER Firms Number of rms for which the state is either the HQ or one of the ER1 3
locations.
State HQ/ER Firms Mkt Cap Aggregate equity market capitalization of rms for which the state is either
the HQ or one of the ER1 3 locations.
Panel E: Investor Portfolio-Level Variables
Local HQ Bias Mean excess portfolio weight of rms headquartered in the investor state,
computed as dierence between the weight of local HQ rms in the investor
portfolio minus the weight of local HQ rms in the market portfolio. Source:
Thomson Reuters, CRSP.
Local ERk Bias Mean excess portfolio weight of rms headquartered in the investor state,
computed as dierence between the weight of local ERk rms in the investor
portfolio minus the weight of local ERk rms in the market portfolio. Source:
Thomson Reuters, CRSP.
Portfolio Raw Return Monthly raw return on the investor portfolio. Source: Thomson Reuters,
CRSP.
Portfolio Alpha Investor portfolio monthly alpha from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
containing the market, size, value, and momentum factors. Source: Thomson
Reuters, CRSP, Ken French's website.
Portfolio Char Adj Return Investor portfolio characteristic-adjusted returns based on Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1997) method. Source: Russell Wermers' web site.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics: Firm-Level 10K-Based Geographic Dispersion and Local Exposure
Measures
This table reports summary statistics for 10K-based geographic dispersion and local exposure measures of U.S.
state-locations mentioned in the annual nancial statements of publicly traded companies between 1998 and 2008.
The sample consists of 66,405 rm-year observations. Details about the variables are available in Table 1. We
report the statistics for the pooled data used in the panel regressions. In Panel A, we report the summary statistics
for the following variables calculated for each rm-year: Num States Cited, Citation Concentration, Citation Share
Rank and the equal-weighted and citation-share-weighted average of the distance from the HQ state. Details about
the variables are available in Table 1. In the rest of Panel A, we examine HQ State, the U.S. state (or District
of Columbia) where the rm headquarters are located; and Cited States, which are U.S. states mentioned at least
once in the relevant sections - 1, 2, 6, and 7 - of the rm annual nancial statement - 10-K, 10-KSB, or 20-F.
Top (3) Cited State(s) is (are) the (three) U.S. state-location(s) with the highest number of mentions in a given
rm-year. Top (3) Non-HQ Cited State(s) is (are) the (three) U.S. state-location(s) other than the rm's HQ state
with the highest number of mentions in a given rm-year. For each of these sets of states, we report the Citation
Share, i.e., our 10K-based local exposure measure, the Citation Share rank within the rm year, and the distance
from HQ (where appropriate). In Panel B, we perform annual sort of rms into terciles based on scal year-end
equity market capitalization (i.e., number of common shares outstanding multiplied by stock price) and classied
as Large, Medium, or Small. T-stat and p-val are the t-statistic and associated p-value, respectively, for the null
hypothesis of no dierence in means across samples, assuming unequal variances. In Panel C, rms are assigned to
one of twelve Fama-French industries based on historical primary SIC codes. T-stat and p-val are the t-statistic
and associated p-value, respectively, for the null hypothesis of no dierence in means between industry i and
industry 12 (Other, which comprises Mining, Construction, Building Material, Transportation, Hotels, Business
Services, and Entertainment), assuming unequal variances.
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Panel A: Firm-Level Location Relevance and Distance Measures
Variable N Mean Std Dev 1st 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 99th
All Cited States
Num States Cited 66,405 8.09 7.81 1 2 3 5 10 24 42
Citation Concentration 66,405 0.376 0.247 0.039 0.078 0.185 0.315 0.506 0.917 1
Dist. from HQ (EW) 66,405 824.3 451.2 0 63.8 535.7 803.5 1088.9 1643.8 1874.8
Dist. from HQ (SW) 66,405 613 447.9 0 19.9 257.5 560.9 880.3 1424.9 1909.7
HQ State
Citation Share 66,405 41.4% 28.3% 0.0% 2.1% 17.9% 36.8% 62.5% 94.7% 100%
Citation Share Rank 66,405 1.85 1.95 1 1 1 1 2 6 10
Top Cited State
Citation Share 66,405 46.1% 24.2% 7.8% 13.3% 27.1% 41.7% 61.8% 94.3% 100%
Distance from HQ 66,405 412.8 720.6 0 0 0 0 607.7 2318.1 2560.7
Top 3 Cited StatesP
Citation Share 66,405 84.0% 20.1% 27.0% 41.9% 71.4% 93.8% 100% 100% 100%
Citation Share Rank 66,405 1.87 0.38 1 1 1.67 2 2 2.43 2.67
Distance from HQ 66,405 744.5 479.3 0 52.7 364.9 724 1050.9 1613.8 1965.7
Top Non-HQ Cited State (ER1)
Citation Share 64,360 21.6% 15.7% 2.0% 3.4% 10.5% 17.6% 28.6% 50.0% 75.0%
Citation Share Rank 64,360 1.66 0.47 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Distance from HQ 64,360 1,074 838.7 26.4 88.4 348.6 848.2 1675.8 2497.5 2660.9
Top 3 Non-HQ Cited State (ER1 3)P
Citation Share 64,360 49.1% 23.2% 3.3% 10.6% 33.3% 50.0% 65.2% 89.7% 100%
Citation Share Rank 64,360 2.42 0.6 1 1.5 2 2.5 2.83 3.4 3.64
Distance from HQ 64,360 1,069.2 615.8 72.9 181.8 620 985.1 1423.9 2298.5 2523.9
Panel B: Number of State Locations Cited, HQ Relevance, and Citation Concentration by Firm Size
Large Medium Small
N=22,130 N=22,139 N=22,136 Small-Medium Small-Large Medium-Large
Mean Mean Mean t-stat p-val t-stat p-val t-stat p-val
Num States Cited 11.21 7.90 5.17  47.50 0.00  85.91 0.00  40.72 0.00
HQ State Citation Share 36.1% 43.1% 45.2% 7.82 0.00 34.38 0.00 26.16 0.00
Citation Concentration 0.315 0.378 0.434 24.02 0.00 52.88 0.00 26.95 0.00
Panel C: Number of State Locations Cited and Citation Concentration by Fama-French 12-Industries
Num States Cited Citation Concentration
Ind(i)-Ind(12) Ind(i)-Ind(12)
FF Industry Mean t-stat p-val Mean t-stat p-val
12 Other 9.30 0.32
11 Money 7.77  13.96 0.00 0.47 43.47 0.00
10 Healthcare 6.13  28.13 0.00 0.41 22.9 0.00
9 Shops 13.70 23.96 0.00 0.27  15.15 0.00
8 Utilities 11.45 10.11 0.00 0.40 11.33 0.00
7 Telecom 10.67 6.35 0.00 0.28  7.65 0.00
6 Bus. Equipment 5.36  42.19 0.00 0.39 23.29 0.00
5 Chemicals 8.04  7.13 0.00 0.33 0.97 0.33
4 Energy 9.42 0.75 0.45 0.32  1.02 0.31
3 Manufacturing 7.58  15.11 0.00 0.33 3.02 0.00
2 Durables 7.42  9.91 0.00 0.35 5.05 0.00
1 Non Durables 8.16  7.19 0.00 0.35 6.39 0.00
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Table 3
State-Level Analysis of the Local Component in Firm Performance and Investment
This table reports the regression estimates for the relation of the portfolios of rms headquartered in state s and
that of rms not headquartered in that state. The portfolio of rms not headquartered in state s comprises either
only rms for which state s is a top three non-HQ state in terms of citation share, ER1 3, or only rms for
which state s is a not a top 3 non-HQ state, Not ER1 3. Portfolio index measures are either value-weighted,
VW, for all rms regardless of their citation share, or alternatively citation share-weighted, SW, for the State
HQ or ER1 3 portfolios. Panel A reports the relation between the average stock return of rms headquartered
and not headquartered in state s, while Panel B reports the relation between the average operating performance
of rms headquartered and not headquartered in state s. Columns 1-3, State-Level Time-Series, in each panel
report mean coecients and associated t-statistics of state-level time-series OLS estimates. Columns 4-6, Month
(or Quarter)-Level Cross-Sections, report mean coecients of Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly (in Panel A)
or quarterly (in Panel B) cross-sectional regression estimates. Excess Market Return, SMB, HML, and UMD
are the Carhart (1997) monthly four factors available on Ken French's website. The t-statistics are reported in
parentheses; those in columns 4-6 are adjusted based on Newey and West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation.
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Panel A: Monthly Stock Return Indexes
Estimation Level: State-Level Time-Series Month-Level Cross-sections
Portfolio Firms: ER1 3 Not ER1 3 ER1 3 ER1 3 Not ER1 3 ER1 3
Weight Scheme: VW VW SW VW VW SW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State HQ Return 0.1022  0.0191 0.3220 0.0358  0.0073 0.0814
(5.88) ( 4.07) (10.53) (4.24) ( 19.87) (6.82)
Excess Market Return 0.8562 1.0202 0.6622
(35.81) (209.34) (24.94)
SMB  0.0338 0.0009 0.5275
( 1.42) (0.99) (23.18)
HML 0.0576 0.0011 0.1466
(1.66) (1.02) (4.97)
UMD  0.0150  0.0008  0.1479
( 1.39) ( 1.71) ( 11.74)
State Num HQ/ER Firms  0.0048 0.0001  0.0012  0.0003 0.0000 0.0007
( 1.47) (1.23) ( 0.41) ( 0.27) (0.96) (0.71)
State HQ/ER Firms Mkt Cap  0.0055 0.0002  0.0042 0.0005 0.0000  0.0002
( 6.80) (4.50) ( 3.00) (0.57) (0.19) ( 0.26)
Avg R2 72.35% 99.94% 75.35% 12.49% 22.30% 14.00%
Num State Time-Series 50 50 50
Num Monthly Cross-Sections 168 168 168
Panel B: Quarterly Portfolio Sales, Protability, and Investment Indexes
Estimation Level: State-Level Time-Series Quarterly-Level Cross-sections
Portfolio Firms: ER1 3 ER1 3 ER1 3 ER1 3 ER1 3 ER1 3













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State HQ Index (SW) 0.2806 0.3170 0.3354 0.0599 0.2837 0.1898
(5.02) (7.15) (7.72) (3.86) (13.30) (7.98)
Market Index (VW) 0.9175 0.9536 0.7383
(7.13) (5.53) (7.00)
State Num HQ/ER Firms  0.0353  0.0149  0.0007 0.0033  0.0035  0.0034
( 2.14) ( 3.24) ( 0.30) (3.24) ( 9.41) ( 12.94)
State HQ/ER Firms Mkt Cap 0.0018 0.0031  0.0001  0.0041 0.0006 0.0010
(0.51) (2.13) ( 0.11) ( 4.97) (1.94) (4.98)
Avg R2 53.07% 49.74% 55.28% 6.60% 23.41% 24.12%
Num State Time-Series 50 50 50
Num Qtr Cross-Sections 44 44 44
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Table 4
Local Return Factors, 10K-Based Measures, and Market-Based Local Exposure Measure
This table reports the marginal impact of local factors as well as the relation between market-based stock localness
and location measures from Financial Statements. Panel A reports measures of goodness of t of pricing models
estimated using 36-month rolling-windows stock-level regression that include various location-based stock market
indexes, some of which are dened on the basis of our 10K-based local exposure measure, as follows: Model (1)
includes the typical U.S. market index; Model (2) includes HQ Index, the local market index estimated using only
rms that share an HQ state with the rm; Model (3) includes HQ/ER1 3 Index, the local market index estimated
using only rms that either share an HQ state with the rm or have an ER1 3 location in the rm's state; and
Model (4) includes HQ/ER1 3 Index plus Non-HQ/ER1 3 Index, the non-local market index that includes rms
that do not have HQ or ER1 3 location in the rm's state. We report the mean and median of pricing error
(jaj), the value-weighted pricing error (VW jaj), and explanatory power (Adj. R2). We also examine models that
include the Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) factors (obtained from Ken French's website). We report
averages weighted by market cap in Panel A1, and unweighted averages in Panel A2. Panel B reports regression
estimates for the relation between rm-level market-based measures of local exposure and 10K-based measures of
local exposure and geographic dispersion. Columns 1-4, Year-State, report mean OLS coecients and associated
t-statistics of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions estimated separately for each state-year cross-section of rms.
Columns 5-8, Year-Firm, report mean OLS coecients and associated t-stats of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions
estimated separately for each rm-year cross-section of states. The dependent variables, Local Beta and Delta
R2, are based on rm-yearend-state 36-month rolling-windows regression estimates of the following three models.
First, for each rm-yearend we estimate the model:
(1) RETRFi;t = ai;t + bMKT;i;t  VWMKTRFt
+ bSMB;i;t  SMBt + bHML;i;t HMLt + bUMD;i;t  UMDt + ei;t:
Then, separately for each rm-yearend-state, we estimate two augmented models that include the excess returns
of local rms (i.e., those with ER1 3 or HQ location in state s):
(2a) RETRFi;t = ai;t + bLOC;i;t;s  VWLocalRF i;t;s + bMKT;i;t  VWMKTRFt
+ bSMB;i;t  SMBt + bHML;i;t HMLt + bUMD;i;t  UMDt + ei;t:
(2b) RETRFi;t = ai;t + bLOC;i;t;s  SWLocalRF i;t;s + bMKT;i;t  VWMKTRFt
+ bSMB;i;t  SMBt + bHML;i;t HMLt + bUMD;i;t  UMDt + ei;t:
where is VWLocalRF i;t;s (SWLocalRF i;t;s) is the value-weighted (citation share-weighted) average monthly
excess return for the portfolio of local rms in state s, excluding rm i; and VWMKTRFt, SMBt, HMLt, and
UMDt are the Carhart (1997) monthly four factors available on Ken French's website. The dependent variable
Local Beta is dened as the rm-year-state estimate bLOC;i;t;s. The dependent variable Delta R
2 is dened as the
dierence between the rm-year-state R2 of models (2a) or (2b) minus the rm-year R2 of model (1). Additional
details about other variables are available in Table 1. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted based



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Relation between Market-Based Stock Localness and Location Measures from Financial Statements
Estimation Level: Year-State Year-Firm
Local Index Weighting: Value Citation Share Value Citation Share
Dependent Variable: Local Delta Local Delta Local Delta Local Delta
Beta R2 Beta R2 Beta R2 Beta R2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HQ State 0.0122  0.0045  0.0717  0.0025  0.0107  0.0044  0.0150 0.0002
(0.73) ( 3.93) ( 3.72) ( 2.09) ( 0.24) ( 2.99) ( 0.62) (0.18)
Cited State 0.0782 0.0023 0.0553 0.0007 0.1116 0.0008 0.1503 0.0030
(15.84) (8.69) (10.51) (2.94) (12.18) (4.38) (28.68) (15.34)
Citation Share 0.2254 0.0131 0.9770 0.041 0.8816 0.0195 0.7633 0.0182
(7.15) (6.90) (23.15) (15.82) (12.06) (9.17) (18.68) (9.94)
Num States Cited 0.0003  0.0001  0.0001 0.0000
(0.96) ( 1.67) ( 0.24) ( 0.68)
Market Cap 0.0094 0.0000  0.1477  0.0025
(3.64) ( 1.02) ( 41.05) ( 31.02)
Avg R2 1.14% 0.64% 6.49% 2.34% 9.44% 6.40% 6.14% 6.22%
Num Cross-Sections 550 550 550 550 50,810 50,810 50,810 50,810
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Table 5
Local Citation Share and Excess Local Ownership
This table reports the mean excess rm-level local institutional ownership as a function of the investor state's
citation share and the distance between the investor's state and the rm's headquarters state. Citation Share is
the citation share of the state in the rm's annual nancial report, which is equal to the number of times the state
is mentioned in the relevant sections of the nancial statement divided by the total number of mentions across
all U.S. states. Distance from HQ (in km) is the distance between the relevant U.S. state population-weighted
centroid and the HQ state population-weighted centroid. Panel A reports the state-level excess ownership as a
function of distance from the rm's HQ state and the state's citation share. Panel B reports the state-level excess
ownership as a function of distance from HQ state and the state's citation share rank within each rm-year: ERK
is the kth most cited non-HQ state in a rm annual nancial statement. Additional details about the variables
are available in Table 1. The sample period is from 1998 to 2008.
Panel A: Excess Local Ownership by Location Citation Share and Distance from HQ
Distance from HQ (in km)
Citation Share HQ State All Non-HQ <500 500 1000 1000 2000 2000 5000
All States 4.73  0.09  0.08  0.17  0.10 0.05
> 0.50 (High) 14.58 6.17 5.97 5.28 7.22 6.92
0.20 to 0.50 8.35 5.28 4.88 3.90 5.11 7.79
0.10 to 0.20 5.46 3.40 3.03 2.15 3.53 5.71
0.05 to 0.10 4.07 2.02 1.76 1.22 2.17 3.44
< 0.05 (Low) 3.02 0.99 0.99 0.60 1.06 1.72
Zero  1.62  0.22  0.29  0.25  0.20  0.15
Panel B: Excess Local Ownership by Location Citation Rank and Distance from HQ
Distance from HQ (in km)
Citation Share Rank All Non-HQ <500 500 1000 1000 2000 2000 5000
Highest (ER1) 5.18 4.91 4.06 5.45 6.40
Second (ER2) 2.60 2.32 1.79 2.70 3.88
Third (ER3) 1.13 0.91 0.91 1.04 2.01
Fourth or Fifth (ER4, ER5) 0.58 0.57 0.39 0.62 0.95
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Table 6
Firm-level Excess Local Ownership Base Regression Estimates
This table reports average parameter estimates from Fama-MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions for the relation
between state aggregate institutional investors' excess ownership in a rm and the rm-level 10K-based geographic
dispersion and local exposure measures. The dependent variable in all models is the state aggregate institutional
investors' excess ownership in the rm. Market-based local exposure measure (Local Beta or Delta R-square),
in columns 4-7, is dened in Table 4. The full model, in column 8, includes the following rm characteristics:
stock price at quarter-end (Price); average Amihud (2002) daily volume price impact during the quarter (Amihud
Illiquidity); stock dividend yield (Dividend Yield); average daily eective spread during the quarter (Eective
Spread); idiosyncratic volatility (Idio Vol); idiosyncratic skewness (Idio Skew); market-to-book ratio (M/B);
market capitalization (Market Cap); R&D expenses scaled by assets (R&D); stock returns in the past six months
(Past Six-Month Return); an indicator variable for rms that are in the top third of volatility, and the top third
of skewness, and the bottom third of price (Lottery Stocks); an indicator variable for S&P500 rms (S&P500 );
and an indicator for rms whose IPO occurred in the prior ve years (Young). Except indicator variables, all
rm characteristics are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Additional details
about the explanatory variables are available in Table 1. Each quarterly regression also includes location xed
eects for U.S. states and the District of Columbia. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted based
on Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
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Market-Based Localness=
Delta Local Delta Local
R2 Beta R2 Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HQ State 6.055 3.175 3.139 6.378 6.375 3.040 3.038 2.390
(7.86) (7.12) (7.08) (8.09) (8.09) (7.59) (7.59) (5.73)
Cited State 0.979 0.340 0.459 0.415 0.415 0.337
(6.26) (4.08) (5.16) (6.44) (6.42) (3.91)
Citation Share 13.330 13.128 12.007 12.005 12.111
(9.86) (9.85) (10.41) (10.41) (12.43)
Num States Cited  0.012  0.009  0.009  0.007
( 8.53) ( 8.04) ( 8.10) ( 7.19)
Market-Based Localness 0.225 0.018 0.122 0.016



























State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avg R2 49.57% 50.13% 50.15% 51.08% 51.08% 51.69% 51.69% 54.73%
Avg N Firm 4,199.8 4,199.8 4,199.8 3,317.5 3,317.5 3,317.5 3,317.5 3,094.9
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Table 7
Firm-level Excess Local Ownership Conditional Regression Estimates
This table reports average parameter estimates from Fama-MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions for the relation
between state aggregate institutional investors' excess ownership in a rm and rm-state 10K-based measures of
geographic dispersion and local exposure, conditional on rm characteristics. The dependent variable in all models
is the state aggregate institutional investors' excess ownership in the rm. Each model includes all explanatory
variables in the full model, column 8, of Table VI, in addition to the interaction of the relevant rm characteristic
with the rm-state 10K-based measures. Except indicator variables, all rm characteristics are standardized to
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Each quarterly regression includes location xed eects
for U.S. states and the District of Columbia. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted based on
Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Firm Characteristics=
Size Amihud Young R&D/Asset Volatility Skewness Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HQ State 2.447 2.784 2.309 2.386 2.387 2.400 2.396
(5.83) (6.55) (6.61) (5.85) (6.09) (5.73) (5.75)
Cited State 0.389 0.893 0.288 0.446 0.436 0.345 0.340
(4.07) (4.36) (3.83) (5.69) (4.98) (3.93) (3.93)
Citation Share 11.370 11.582 10.875 11.537 11.518 12.036 11.998
(12.00) (10.96) (12.92) (10.88) (11.51) (12.51) (12.64)
Firm Char. 0.033  0.252  0.067  0.004  0.014  0.018 0.001
(9.59) ( 3.74) ( 9.91) ( 1.35) ( 2.28) ( 7.61) (0.60)
Firm Char.  HQ State  0.079 4.409 0.124 0.210 0.758 0.142 0.123
( 1.24) (3.04) (0.49) (1.10) (4.05) (1.38) (3.07)
Firm Char.  Cited State 0.001 4.421 0.255 0.616 0.483 0.049 0.039
(0.04) (3.01) (4.33) (7.38) (11.58) (2.41) (2.35)
Firm Char.  Citation Share  4.453 6.737 3.390  2.857 2.650 0.564  3.518
( 7.78) (2.44) (7.81) ( 7.12) (7.43) (2.24) ( 4.14)
Num States Cited  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.007  0.007
( 7.34) ( 8.45) ( 7.37) ( 5.58) ( 6.42) ( 6.93) ( 6.76)
Other Firm-Level Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avg R2 54.77% 55.10% 54.77% 54.76% 54.80% 54.75% 54.74%
Avg N Firms 3,094.9 3,094.9 3,094.9 3,094.9 3,094.9 3,094.9 3,094.9
56
Table 8
Regression of Subsequent Returns on Levels of and Changes in Firm-Level Local and
Nonlocal Ownership
This table reports average parameter estimates from Fama-MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions for the relation
between stock returns in quarter t+1 and the institutional ownership levels at the end of quarter t 1 and changes
during quarter t, conditional on rm and institutional investor locations. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable
is the rm's quarterly raw return; in columns 4-5, the dependent variable is the rm's quarterly characteristic-
adjusted return based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method. The main explanatory variables
are the institutional ownership levels at quarter t  1, %Own(t 1), and the institutional ownership changes during
quarter t, %Own(t 1)!t. These variables are measured separately for: institutional investors located in the rm's
headquarters state, Local HQ ; and institutional investors located away from the rm's headquarters state, Non-
HQ. We further divide the latter group into institutional investors located in any of the rm's top three non-HQ
economically relevant states, Local ER1 3; and institutional investors located away from the rm's headquarters
state and top three non-HQ economically relevant states, Non-Local. No ER States is an indicator variable equal
to 1 when the rm mentions no non-HQ state in its annual nancial statement, and 0 otherwise. Details about
the rm characteristics are available in Table 1. The parameter estimates are reported in percentages. The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted based on Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.
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Raw Stock Returns Characteristic-Adjusted Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local HQ %Own(t 1) 2.720 2.759 2.086 0.778 0.993
(2.60) (2.64) (2.33) (1.08) (1.42)
 Local HQ %Own(t 1)!t 1.852 1.894 1.825 1.227 1.536
(2.24) (2.45) (2.58) (1.18) (1.43)
Non-HQ %Own(t 1) 0.039
(0.54)
 Non-HQ %Own(t 1)!t 0.064
(0.10)
Local ER1 3 %Own(t 1) 1.706 0.045 0.295
(2.48) (0.07) (0.49)
 Local ER1 3 %Own(t 1)!t 4.111 4.799 5.137
(3.25) (4.24) (4.11)
Non-Local %Own(t 1) 0.074  0.001 0.003
(0.96) ( 0.02) (0.04)
 Non-Local %Own(t 1)!t  0.051  0.178  0.105
( 0.07) ( 0.27) ( 0.16)
No ER States 2.232  0.070  0.056
(4.05) ( 0.23) ( 0.22)
Amihud Illiquidity 0.710 0.710 0.610 0.488 0.533
(3.31) (3.31) (3.00) (2.43) (2.50)
Dividend Yield 0.060 0.063 0.071  0.034  0.013
(0.44) (0.47) (0.52) ( 0.55) ( 0.18)
Idio. Skewness 0.126 0.128 0.100 0.038  0.064
(1.68) (1.70) (1.35) (0.63) ( 0.77)
Idio. Volatility  0.540  0.540  0.586  0.232  0.373
( 1.19) ( 1.19) ( 1.31) ( 0.66) ( 1.18)
M/B  0.076  0.076  0.074  0.025  0.031
( 3.63) ( 3.62) ( 3.69) ( 0.28) ( 0.32)
Market Cap  0.375  0.375  0.372  0.021  0.046
( 1.72) ( 1.71) ( 1.72) ( 0.27) ( 0.54)
Past Six-Month Return 0.880 0.882 0.898  0.158  0.145
(2.38) (2.40) (2.39) ( 1.16) ( 1.26)
S&P 500 1.608 1.585 1.833 0.873 0.760
(2.98) (2.90) (3.68) (2.15) (2.04 )
Young  0.758  0.752  0.833  0.286  0.387







Avg. N 3,262 3,262 3,262 3,048 3,048
Avg. R2 7.89% 7.96% 8.26% 2.67% 3.64%
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Table 9
Regression of Subsequent Returns on Changes in Local and Nonlocal Ownership,
Conditional on Firm Characteristics
This table reports average parameter estimates from Fama-MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions for the relation
between rm stock returns in quarter t+1 and quarter t changes in rm's institutional ownership atHQ and ER1 3
rm location, and their respective interaction with indicator variables for the following rm characteristics: small
(below-median market capitalizion), illiquid (above-median Amihud illiquidity measure), young (stocks whose
IPO occurred in the prior ve years), R&D intensive (above-median R&D over asset ratio), volatile (above-median
idiosyncratic stock return volatility), skewed (above-median idiosyncratic stock return skewness), and low priced
(below-median stock price). In all models, the dependent variable is the rm quarterly characteristic-adjusted stock
return based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method. All models include all the explanatory
variables reported in column 5 of Table 8. The parameter estimates are reported in percentages. The t-statistics




Small Illiquid Young Intensive Volatile Skewed Priced
 Local HQ %Own(t 1)!t 1.261  1.259 0.824  1.654 2.700 0.582  0.315
(1.59) ( 1.87) (0.70) ( 1.47) (1.97) (0.63) ( 0.33)
 Local HQ %Own(t 1)!t * Char. Ind.  4.970 3.709  1.798 4.136  5.846 0.129 0.364
( 2.79) (2.46) ( 0.57) (1.12) ( 2.92) (0.06) (0.16)
 Local ER1 3 %Own(t 1)!t 3.507 3.534 3.099 3.698 2.987 1.572 3.926
(3.33) (2.46) (1.76) (2.71) (1.92) (0.91) (2.98)
 Local ER1 3 %Own(t 1)!t * Char. Ind. 3.417 3.207 4.273 3.767 4.082 5.556 0.745
(1.99) (3.02) (2.13) (1.75) (2.05) (2.74) (0.54)
Local and Non-Local %Own(t 1) Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Non-Local %Own(t 1)!t Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avg. N 3,048 3,048 3,048 3,048 3,048 3,048 3,048
Avg. Adj. R2 4.40% 4.35% 4.37% 4.39% 4.41% 4.38% 4.37%
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Table 10
Economic Relevance and Institutional-Level Local Bias Estimates
This table reports institution-level local bias estimates for the full sample of institutions and various subsets
of institutions. For each institutional investor's portfolio, we divide the holdings into three mutually exclusive
categories: (i) Local HQ : rms headquartered in the investor's state; (ii) Local ER1 3: rms for which the
investor's state is one of the top three non-HQ states in terms of citation share; and (iii) Non-Local. We report
the mean local bias, i.e., the mean excess portfolio weight { the actual weight in the investor portfolio minus the
weight in the hypothetical market portfolio for locally headquartered rms or rms with local economic exposure.
We report the equal-weighted and dollar-weighted averages across institutions. The dollar-weighted averages use
the size of the institutional portfolios to weight the institutional-level local bias quarterly observations. Panel
A reports the local bias estimates for the full sample. The rest of the table reports the local bias estimates for
various subsamples of institutional investors based on: 13(f) institutional types, Panel B; portfolio value quintile,
Panel C; and the number of stocks in the portfolio, Panel D. Additional details about the variables are available
in Table 1. The sample period is from 1998 to 2008.
Equal-Weighted Dollar-Weighted
HQ+ HQ+
% Tot HQ ER1 3 ER1 3 HQ ER1 3 ER1 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: All Institutions
Full Sample 100 1.78 3.18 4.96  0.61 2.97 2.36
Panel B: Institution Type Subsamples
Inv. Companies & Advisors 55.49 1.66 3.24 4.90  0.48 3.00 2.52
Pension & Endowment Funds 6.91 0.24 2.93 3.17  1.52 2.73 1.21
Banks & Insurance Firms 35.7 2.18 3.47 5.65  0.74 3.24 2.50
Panel C: Institution Subsamples Based on Portfolio Size
Smallest Portfolios 0.43 2.51 2.86 5.37 2.55 2.67 5.22
Q2 1.07 2.69 3.37 6.06 3.42 3.15 6.57
Q3 2.26 1.98 3.29 5.27 2.53 3.07 5.6
Q4 6.32 1.13 3.18 4.31 1.75 2.97 4.72
Largest Portfolios 89.92 0.17 2.99 3.16  0.91 2.79 1.88
Panel D: Institution Subsamples Based on Number of Stocks in the Portfolio
100 Stocks 9.27 1.26 2.93 4.19  0.14 3.22 3.08
101 250 11.18 2.49 3.59 6.08 1.33 3.19 4.52
251 500 11.72 1.99 3.75 5.74 0.69 3.09 3.78
501 1000 18.22 2.31 2.94 5.25 1.31 2.74 4.05
1001 2000 22.3 0.83 2.83 3.66  1.26 2.64 1.38
>2000 Stocks 27.32 0.36 1.91 2.27  2.19 1.78  0.41
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Table 11
Holdings and Trading Performance of Institutional Investors in Their Local and
Non-Local Portfolios
This table reports the average performance of institutional investors' local and non-local holdings. For each
institution with non-zero portfolio weight in local stocks, we calculate the monthly raw, characteristics-adjusted
returns, and alpha of its local and non-local portfolios, as well as the performance dierential between the local
and non-local sub-portfolios. As in Table 10, for each institutional investor's quarterly portfolio, we divide the
holdings into 3 mutually exclusive categories: Local HQ, Local ER1 3, and Non-Local. Column (1), Raw, reports
mean portfolio raw returns. Column (2), Alpha, reports mean portfolio alphas from Carhart (1997) four-factor
model that contains the market, size, value, and momentum factors. Columns (3-6), Cadj, report mean portfolio
characteristic-adjusted returns based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method. We compute
the average values of the portfolio performance estimates across all institutions each month, and then report the
time-series averages of the monthly averages. The monthly averaging across institutions is value-weighted by the
total dollar value of the institution's holdings at the beginning of the quarter. Columns (1-3) report results using
the full sample of institutions. Columns (4-6) report mean portfolio performance for the following types of 13(f)
institutions: investment companies and advisors in Column (4); pension and endowment funds in Column (5);
and banks and insurance rms in Column (6). Panel A reports holdings-based performance and Panel B reports
the trading-based performance. Trading-based performance is dened as the dierence in monthly returns of
the holdings snapshot at the end of the preceding quarter minus the holdings snapshot at the beginning of the
preceding quarter. The t-statistics reported in parentheses below the Non Local performance estimates are for
the null hypothesis of zero Non-Local performance. The t-statistics in brackets are for the null hypothesis of no
dierence in mean performance across local and non-local institutional sub-portfolios. Both types of t-statistics
are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987).
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All All All InvAdv PenEnd Banks
Raw Alpha Cadj Cadj Cadj Cadj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Holdings-Based Performance Estimates
Non-Local 1.07 0.103 0.096 0.112 0.064 0.075
(t-stat) (2.82) (1.10) (1.11) (1.30) (0.75) (1.02)
Local HQ 1.139 0.175 0.142 0.149 0.149 0.124
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.45] [1.59] [1.08] [0.62] [1.47] [0.75]
Local ER1 3 1.293 0.358 0.266 0.362 0.134 0.143
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [3.21] [3.42] [3.28] [3.97] [0.91] [1.24]
Local (HQ + ER1 3) 1.242 0.292 0.221 0.285 0.14 0.137
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.54] [3.07] [2.09] [2.48] [1.31] [1.29]
Panel B: Trading-Based Performance Estimates
Non-Local 0.093 0.028 0.051 0.078 0.057 0.033
(t-stat) (1.31) (0.27) (1.02) (0.97) (0.82) (0.32)
Local HQ 0.082 0.034 0.037 0.031 0.055 0.054
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [ 0.34] [0.05] [ 0.12] [ 0.35] [ 0.01] [0.21]
Local ER1 3 0.177 0.145 0.157 0.312 0.136 0.105
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.61] [2.91] [3.02] [2.74] [1.21] [1.12]
Local (HQ + ER1 3) 0.145 0.107 0.116 0.216 0.108 0.087
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.54] [2.21] [1.83] [1.97] [0.64] [0.54]
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Table 12
Local Bias and Local Portfolio Performance of Institutional Investors, Conditional on
Portfolio Firm Localness
This table reports mean institutional investor local bias, Panel A, and local and non-local portfolio performance,
Panels B & C, conditional on rm-state citation share. As in Table 10, for each institutional investor's quarterly
portfolio, we divide the holdings into 3 mutually exclusive categories: Local HQ, Local ER1 3, and Non-Local.
Then, within each category, we separate rms by their citation share of the investor's state: those with citation
share in the top tercile, Top Tercile, and all others, Others. Panel A reports equal-weighted and dollar-weighted
mean excess local holdings across quarterly institutional portfolios. The dollar-weighted means are based on the
value of the institutional quarterly portfolios. Excess local holdings are dened as the actual weight of local rms
in the investor portfolio minus their hypothetical weight in the market portfolio. Panels B and C report the
average performance of institutional investors' local and non-local holdings. We compute the average values of
the portfolio performance estimates across all institutions each month, and then report the time-series averages
of the monthly averages. The monthly averaging across institutions is value-weighted by the total dollar value of
the institution's holdings at the beginning of the quarter. In Panels B and C, the t-statistics in brackets are for
the null hypothesis of no dierence in mean performance across local and non-local institutional sub-portfolios. In
all panels, superscripts a, b, and c indicate a one-sided p-value below 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for the null
hypothesis of no dierence in means across Top Tercile and Others.
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Panel A: Investor Portfolio Local Bias, Sorted by Firm-State's Citation Share
Equal-Weighted Dollar-Weighted
Firm-State Citation Share: Top Tercile Others Top Tercile Others
Local HQ 1.767a 0.218  0.039  1.513
(2.43) (0.13) ( 0.05) ( 1.03)
Local ER1 3 5.124a 0.821 5.501a 0.67
(2.82) (0.38) (3.41) (0.50)
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 6.891a 1.04 5.434a -0.829
(3.25) (0.80) (2.62) (0.64)
Panel B: Portfolio Holdings-based Performance, Sorted by Firm-State's Citation Share
Raw Return Characteristic-Adjusted Return
Firm-State Citation Share: Top Tercile Others Top Tercile Others
Non-Local 0.99 1.025 0.107 0.095
Local HQ 1.287 1.000 0.332b 0.064
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.12] [-0.15] [2.07] [-0.27]
Local ER1 3 1.442 1.258 0.514b 0.177
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [3.57] [2.31] [3.22] [1.02]
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 1.329 1.132 0.382c 0.12
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.85] [1.26] [2.72] [1.04]
Panel C: Portfolio Trading-based Performance, Sorted by Firm-State's Citation Share
Raw Return Characteristic-Adjusted Return
Firm-State Citation Share: Top Tercile Others Top Tercile Others
Non-Local 0.091 0.095 0.054 0.048
Local HQ 0.092 0.072 0.062 0.012
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [0.01] [-0.32] [0.10] [-0.27]
Local ER1 3 0.27 0.127 0.334a 0.062
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.19] [0.41] [3.43] [0.12]
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 0.211 0.109 0.243b 0.045
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.85] [0.17] [2.42] [-0.03]
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Table 13
Local Bias and Local Portfolio Performance of Institutional Investors, Conditional on
Portfolio Localness
This table reports mean institutional investor excess local holdings and portfolio performance conditional on the
distribution of rm-state citation shares within the investor portfolio. As in Table 10, for each institutional
investor's quarterly portfolio, we divide the holdings into 3 mutually exclusive categories: Local HQ, Local ER1 3,
and Non-Local. Then, we compute the state citation share mean and standard deviation for each investor's local
portfolios: (1) State-HQ Portfolio Mean Cit. Sh. and State-HQ Portfolio St. Dev. State Cit. Sh. for the Local
HQ portfolio; and (2) State-ER1 3 Portfolio Mean Cit. Sh. and State-ER1 3 Portfolio St. Dev. State Cit. Sh.
for the Local ER1 3 portfolio. Finally, we sort investors based on how their HQ or ER1 3 portfolio citation share
mean and standard deviation compare with the sample median, High or Low. We compute the average values of
the portfolio performance estimates across all institutions each month, and then report the time-series averages of
the monthly averages. The monthly averaging across institutions is value-weighted by the total dollar value of the
institution's holdings at the beginning of the quarter. The t-statistics in brackets are for the null hypothesis of
no dierence in mean performance across local and non-local institutional sub-portfolios. Superscripts a, b, and c
indicate a one-sided p-value below 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for the null hypothesis of no dierence in means
across (High) and (Low) investor groups.
Panel A: Investor Portfolio, Sorted by HQ Portfolio Citation Share Mean and Std. Dev
State-HQ Portfolio Mean Cit. Sh.: Low High
State-HQ Portfolio St. Dev. State Cit. Sh.: Low High Low High
Mean Local Bias
Local HQ  0.622  0.720  0.458  0.549
( 0.73) ( 1.01) ( 0.57) ( 0.64)
Local ER1 3 2.732 2.925 3.044 3.416
(3.13) (3.42) (3.19) (3.31)
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 1.614 1.71 1.877 2.094
(2.01) (1.85) (1.93) (2.17)
Holding-based Mean Characteristic-Adjusted Monthly Return
Non-Local 0.100 0.085 0.117 0.083
Local HQ 0.151 0.145 0.168 0.105
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [0.85] [1.23] [0.87] [0.20]
Local ER1 3 0.290c 0.134 0.456a 0.184
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.47] [1.02] [2.91] [1.93]
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 0.244c 0.138 0.360a 0.158
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.12] [1.22] [2.72] [1.41]
Trading-based Mean Characteristic-Adjusted Monthly Return
Non-Local  0.008 0.013 0.128 0.065
Local HQ 0.045 0.035 0.057 0.062
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [0.47] [0.24] [-0.45] [-0.08]
Local ER1 3 0.202 0.038 0.372a 0.072
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.18] [0.35] [2.31] [0.12]
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 0.150 0.037 0.267a 0.069
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.59] [0.33] [1.21] [0.21]
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Panel B: Investor Portfolio, Sorted by ER1 3 Portfolio Citation Share Mean and Std. Dev.
State-ER1 3 Portfolio Mean Cit. Sh.: Low High
State-ER1 3 Portfolio St. Dev. State Cit. Sh.: Low High Low High
Mean Local Bias
Local HQ  0.561  0.519  0.641  0.702
( 0.55) ( 0.47) ( 0.72) ( 0.61)
Local ER1 3 2.435 2.228 4.010 3.623
(2.67) (2.62) (3.45) (3.51)
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 1.437 1.312 2.460 2.182
(1.55) (1.43) (3.09) (2.37)
Holding-based Mean Characteristic-Adjusted Monthly Return
Non-Local 0.081 0.067 0.092 0.128
Local HQ 0.127 0.16 0.146 0.145
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [0.11] [1.07] [1.28] [0.37]
Local ER1 3 0.176 0.153 0.469a 0.263
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [2.04] [1.65] [4.35] [2.42]
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 0.162 0.155 0.362b 0.235
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.63] [1.33] [3.05] [2.19]
Trading-based Mean Characteristic-Adjusted Monthly Return
Non-Local 0.022 0.057 0.080 0.059
Local HQ 0.053 0.024 0.052 0.081
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [0.31] [ 0.22] [ 0.21] [0.29]
Local ER1 3 0.141 0.070 0.319a 0.147
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.97] [0.63] [3.21] [1.74]
Local (HQ+ER1 3) 0.112 0.054 0.230c 0.125
[t-stat vs. Non-Local] [1.38] [ 0.16] [1.92] [0.86]
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